Cheget (Russian: Чегет) is a "nuclear briefcase" (named after Mount Cheget [ru] in Kabardino-Balkaria) and a part of the automatic system for the command and control of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) named Kazbek (Казбек, named after Mount Kazbek on the Georgia–Russia border).[1] From when it was first developed, a "nuclear suitcase" has been available to the Russian head of state, Minister of Defense and the head of the General Staff.[2]

The Russian "nuclear briefcase" from the early 1990s on display at the Boris Yeltsin Presidential Center in Yekaterinburg.

History

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The cheget was developed during Yuri Andropov's administration in the early 1980s. The suitcase was put into service just as Mikhail Gorbachev took office as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985.[3] It is connected to the special communications system code-named Kavkaz (Кавказ, the Russian name for the Caucasus region), which "supports communication between senior government officials while they are making the decision whether to use nuclear weapons, and in its own turn is plugged into Kazbek, which embraces all the individuals and agencies involved in command and control of the Strategic Nuclear Forces."

The President of Russia (the Supreme Commander-in-Chief) has a cheget on hand at all times. It is one of three, with the other two held by the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff. It may be that affirmations from two of the three are needed to trigger an actual launch.[4][5][6] The General Staff receives the signal and initiates the nuclear strike through the passing of authorization codes to missile silo launch complexes/ballistic missile submarines or by remotely launching individual land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)/submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).[7]

On 25 January 1995, in the Norwegian rocket incident, the cheget was activated in response to a misidentified three-stage scientific sounding rocket (Brant XII as third stage), launched by Norwegian and U.S. scientists; it was the only known time a nuclear briefcase has been activated in preparation for an attack.[3]

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See also

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References

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  1. ^ "О дискуссии по поводу планов создания ОГК ССС: Не все так однозначно - комментарий И.В. Сутягина" [On the discussion about the plans to create OGK SSS: Not everything is so simple - comment by I.V. Sutyagin]. Archived from the original on 25 December 2007. Retrieved 14 January 2008.
  2. ^ "Приключения ядерного чемоданчика" [The Adventures of the Nuclear Suitcase]. 6 June 2014. Retrieved 25 January 2023.
  3. ^ a b David Hoffman (15 March 1998). "Cold-War Doctrines Refuse to Die". Washington Post. Retrieved 7 August 2014.
  4. ^ Do Russia’s military setbacks increase the risk of nuclear conflict?, The Economist, 14 Sept 2022, accessed 25 January 2023
  5. ^ Mikhail Tsypkin (September 2004). "Adventures of the "Nuclear Briefcase"". Strategic Insights. 3 (9). Archived from the original on 23 September 2004.
  6. ^ Alexander Golts (20 May 2008). "A 2nd Briefcase for Putin". Moscow Times. Archived from the original on 4 June 2011.
  7. ^ Alexander A. Pikayev (Spring–Summer 1994). "Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine: Who can push the Button?" (PDF). The Nonproliferation Review. 1 (3): 31–46. doi:10.1080/10736709408436550. Retrieved 6 August 2014.
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