Islamic State in Kurdistan

The Islamic State in Kurdistan refers to various organized clandestine cell systems operating in Kurdistan who gave their allegiance to the Islamic State, as well as the activities of the Islamic State organization in Kurdistan.

Islamic State in Kurdistan
Leaders	Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (2014–2019) † (Leader of ISIL) Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (2019–2022) † (Leader of ISIL) Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (2022–2022) † (Leader of ISIL) Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi (2022–2023) † (Leader of ISIL) Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (2023–present) (Leader of ISIL)
Dates of operation	2014–2024
Group(s)	Predominantly Kurds
Active regions	Kurdistan
Ideology	Salafism Salafist Jihadism Takfirism Wahhabism Anti-Shi'ism Anti-Christian sentiment Anti-Yazidi sentiment
Part of	Islamic State
Opponents	State opponents: Turkey Iraq Iran Ba'athist Syria until December 2024 Non-state opponents: Kurdistan Region SNA SDF PKK Ansar al-Islam Kurdistan Brigades Kurdish Hezbollah
Battles and wars	Syrian civil war War in Iraq (2013–2017) Islamic State insurgency in Iraq (2017–present) Rojava–Islamist conflict Turkey–Islamic State conflict

Background

An Islamic State fighter of Chechen background had confirmed that the Islamic State plans to make Kurdistan into an official Wilayah (province) within its caliphate, although it was repeatedly delayed due to the Islamic State's failure to control any significant land in Kurdistan. However, there have been many organized cells, dominated by Kurds who operate in Kurdistan, which are connected to each other through their mutual allegiance to the Islamic State. The Islamic State later made an official administrative position called the "Wali of Kurdistan", in which someone is appointed to control the Islamic State activities in Kurdistan and report back to the Caliph. A Wali is the ruler of a Wilayah, which is an administrative region inside a Caliphate.

Activities

In December 2013, there were reports of the Islamic State making a Kurdistan wilayah (province). The purported Kurdistan wilayah was to be under the rule of Kurdish senior militants, who reported directly to the Islamic State's top leaders. The alleged wilayah included Kurdish-majority areas in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran, and the proclamation of the wilayah was publicly announced by an Islamic State senior leader in Nineveh. Al-Qaeda, whose ideology is based on the thoughts of Osama bin Laden, had also included Kurdistan as a wilayah within their planned caliphate, which reportedly inspired the Islamic State to form a Kurdistan wilayah as well.

Following the Fall of Fallujah, and the Fall of Mosul, the Islamic State declared itself a caliphate on 29 June 2014, with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the caliph.

Ansar al-Islam and the Kurdistan Brigades, two closely allied groups, were the top jihadist groups among Kurds. Ansar al-Islam was pro-Al-Qaeda, while the Kurdistan Brigades was an official faction of Al-Qaeda. They were both allied to the Islamic State of Iraq, which was an Al-Qaeda affiliate at the time. Later in 2010, the Kurdistan Brigades disbanded, and the Islamic State of Iraq also disbanded in April 2013. The Islamic State was founded on April 7, 2013, as a successor of the Islamic State of Iraq, and it became an enemy of Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups. After the Islamic State was founded, Ansar al-Islam began fighting fiercely against them, with both groups exchanging fire for months. The Islamic State had won the conflict. Later, in July 2014, in a surprising move which sparked many questions and controversies, many Ansar al-Islam leaders pledged their allegiance to the Islamic State. On 29 August 2014, over 50 Ansar al-Islam commanders, and high-ranking members, pledged their allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Ansar al-Islam, despite its significant losses, continued to operate and oppose the Islamic State. In April 2014, a spokesman of the Kurdistan Brigades released a statement in which he criticised the Kurds who joined the Islamic State.

On Newroz 2015, the Islamic State released a 24-minute propaganda video in Kurdish. The main speaker in the video was Abu Khattab al-Kurdi, who promised that the Islamic State was going to "bring the Caliphate to Kurdistan". The video ended with three Peshmerga soldiers each being beheaded by a different Kurdish militant.

The Islamic State in Kurdistan also claimed responsibility for two bombings in Hasakah, _targeting Newroz celebrations, which resulted in as many as 45 people dying.

A Syrian Kurdish activist who lived under the Islamic State for a period of time, in an interview, said that many of the high-ranking Kurds in the Islamic State were Iraqi Kurds, with a significant amount of Iranian Kurds and Turkish Kurds, as well as many Syrian Kurds. He claimed that Syrian Kurds had much less communication with the Islamic State, and therefore were more likely to believe rumours about the Islamic State, but many still joined them. Although he opposed the Islamic State, he refuted claims that the Islamic State was anti-Kurdish, and claimed that they do not differentiate between Kurds and Arabs, and that they do not fight Kurds because they are Kurds, but they fight secular-nationalist Kurdish groups because they are against their religious doctrine. In early 2015, the number of Kurds in the Islamic State was estimated to be 3,000. They were dubbed the "Kurds of the Caliphate" due to their rejection of their Iraqi, Syrian, Turkish, or Iranian citizenships, as well as their rejection of loyalty to the Kurdish nationalist movement.

Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, in a statement released in September 2014, stated "we do not fight the Kurds because they are Kurds. Rather we fight the disbelievers amongst them, the allies of the crusaders and Jews in their war against the Muslims. As for the Muslim Kurds, they are our people and brothers wherever they may be. We spill our blood to save their blood. The Kurds in the ranks of the Islamic State are many, and they are the toughest of fighters against the disbelievers amongst their people."

Mullah Shwan Kurdi joined the Islamic State during its early stages and rose to be a senior member. Mullah Shwan appeared in a video in early 2015, in which he interviewed 20 Peshmerga fighters and 1 Iraqi soldier, who were locked in cages.

Another famous preacher named Ismail Susayi, based in Erbil, also pledged his allegiance to the Islamic State and was arrested in 2018 after he was involved in an attack on governmental offices in Erbil. Dastbar Othman, a Kurdish teen from Germany who frequently visited Susayi during his trips to Iraqi Kurdistan, was also arrested after he moved to Iraqi Kurdistan to be an informant for the Islamic State.

The Islamic State's influence increased quickly in Adıyaman and Bingöl, in Turkish Kurdistan, with many either leaving to join the Islamic State, or forming Islamic State cells in their cities. Adıyaman had the deadliest Islamic State cell in all of Turkey, and out of the 21-person cell, 18 were Kurdish natives of Adıyaman, which led to surprise due to how at that time Kurds were associated with the YPG in the media. Some Kurds in Turkey also preferred living under the Islamic State over living in Turkey, claiming that the Islamic State would not persecute them for being Kurds.

The Kurds who were loyal to the Islamic State were crucial during the Siege of Kobanî, in which both the Kurds of Kobanî as well as the Kurds who travelled there, had guided the Islamic State through the terrain and language barriers. While many of the Kurds of Kobanî welcomed the Islamic State out of genuine support, others welcomed them because they hated the PYD to the point they viewed the Islamic State as a better alternative.

In 2018, an Iranian Kurdish man named Saryas Sadeghi, who worked as an Islamic State recruiter, had blown himself up at the Shrine of Ruhollah Khomeini. The majority of Kurds in Iran who sympathised with the Islamic State had crossed to Iraqi Kurdistan or to Syria in order to join its Kurdish faction, although a small minority of them crossed into Afghanistan to join the Islamic State – Khorasan Province.

In 2017, a Kurdish group known as the White Flags emerged. American defence and military officials claimed that the White Flags were a union of Kurdish ISIS and Ansar al-Islam remnants, however it was just allegations, as the Kurds of the Islamic State had continued fighting for the Islamic State under sleeper cells. It was also alleged that the White Flags are allied with the Islamic State, however the allegations are baseless as the two groups never interacted. The White Flags have been inactive since 2018. The common consensus was that the White Flags were an Ansar al-Islam faction which attempted to rebrand and failed.

In January 2021, Abu Sadiq, the Wali of Kurdistan, was killed in an ISOF operation which also killed Abu Yasser al-Issawi.

In July 2021, Iraqi ICTS forces collaborated with Kurdish CTG to crackdown on Islamic State cells across the country. Later in December, Kurdish security forces disrupted dozens of Islamic State sleeper cells across Iraqi Kurdistan, and the Kurdistan Region Security Council (KRSC) confirmed that most Islamic State cell members which they arrested have been Kurds. The cell leader was arrested on December 13, in an operation 72 hours after the arrest of 25 Islamic State members from Halabja, Said Sadiq, Khurmal, Sirwan, and Erbil.

Two Kurdish sleeper cells of the Islamic State were disrupted in August 2022, and Kurdistan was referred to as a "fertile ground" for the Islamic State ideology.

In July 2023, an Islamic State commander who was involved in the Camp Speicher massacre was found and arrested in Sulaymaniyah.