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Purpose of paring down In Western philosophy

Per the comments under Gobbledygook? and A paragraph that belongs elsewhere I've weeded out what appear to me to be extensive technicalities that properly are better placed in the relevant technical sections that follow the Introduction. By doing this I hope to have fashioned the Introduction to have a simple clear thread that leads the reader to these discussions, without caveats and digressions that require a lot of explanation to be at all clear, not suitable for the Introduction. I also have added some sources and changed some wording.

The Introduction has three themes as it stands revised: the contrast between intuitive free will and determinism, the corresponding moral dilemma, and the resistance of the compatibilists. The details and merits of these positions is not the aim here, just that they are there, stated free from caveats, jargon, distinctions and other technicalities best found later where the details can be made sense of. Brews ohare (talk) 19:53, 12 December 2012 (UTC)

Your essay approach of inserting random content without putting it in context of the existing philosophical framework is flawed. All it does is insert an implicit bias. If you are going to support an "overview" section - which I made clear was an extremely difficult task to achieve in a neutral manner - it is going to have to at the very least represent all sides, and not just glorify quotations that you happen to like. There is nothing wrong with the quotations as such, but they must be used only so far as to make a point being discussed in this article.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 13:33, 13 December 2012 (UTC)

I won't pursue this further at this time. The claims of "implicit bias" and "random content" are unsubstantiated. The same quotes appear in the reverted version but now are separated with shoehorned technicalities that make the introduction unintelligible. The language is awkward: for example, the substitution of "This intuitive feeling of free will does not however necessitate its existence" for "However, intuition can be mistaken" is only one indication of a silly preference for pretentious phrasing that pervades this article. Brews ohare (talk) 16:18, 13 December 2012 (UTC)

Here is a beauty:

"Although incompatibilist metaphysical libertarianism generally represents the bulk of non-materialist constructions,[7] including the popular claim of being able to consciously veto an action or competing desire,[17][18] compatibilist theories have been developed based on identity dualism in which "the experience of conscious free will is the first-person perspective of the neural correlates of choosing".[19]" Brews ohare (talk) 17:36, 13 December 2012 (UTC)

Besides making the introduction unintelligible and pretentious, these changes have been made without attention to what is reverted. For example, to support the statement that intuition is not infallible, the careful reference in the reverted text to:

TW Clark (1999). "Fear of mechanism: A compatibilist critique of The Volitional Brain". Journal of Consciousness Studies. 6 (8–9): 279–93. Feelings or intuitions per se never count as self-evident proof of anything. For full text on line see this.

which provides an exact quote from this work and a link to its full text is replaced by a secondary reference to:

Azim F Shariff, Jonathan Schooler, Kathleen D Vohs (2008). "The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will". In John Baer, James C. Kaufman, Roy F. Baumeister, eds (ed.). Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. p. 183,190,191. ISBN 0195189639. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

which does not present the quote, leaving the reader unclear what the source is intended to support. This footnote also provides a source that only paraphrases Clark, and its link does not connect to the correct page in Baumeister, so the reader will never find the Clark reference and has no idea why Baumeister was cited in this connection. Brews ohare (talk) 16:56, 13 December 2012 (UTC)

I have added your addition reference (Clark) - and can see how the wording in this sentence might seem pretentious. Note on the opposite extreme is "vague", and I don't think anyone wants that here either.

The Shariff/Schooler/Vohs source is now being used to make/support a number of claims, and is explicitly referenced 3 times;

"feeling, we must repeat, is not enough. It is an idea worth considering that the belief in free will may be the only variety of free will worth wanting, but this is a separate debate" (p192)

This intuitive feeling of free will does not however necessitate its existence.

"Intricately related to the hard problem of consciousness, the hard problem of free will represents the core problem of conscious free will: Does conscious volition impact the material world?" (p183)

[direct quote]

"Hence, when considering conscious free will - disparaged by all the same argument that should make consciousness go away - one wonders if there isn't room for another anomaly in this otherwise physical world. Of course, speculating that free will is a plausible second anomaly in an otherwise materialist world must be done with great caution" (p190)

They have even left open the possibility of a "second anomaly" (free will), given that "consciousness manages to exist, in spite of the fact that from a material standpoint it should not"

"There are three broad camps in the battle for free will - hard determinist, compatiblist, and libertarian - and membership to these groups by and largefalls along materialist-mentalist party lines" (p191)

Although incompatibilist metaphysical libertarianism generally represents the bulk of non-materialist constructions

"the experience of conscious free will is the first-person perspective of the neural correlates of choosing" (p193)

[direct quote, discussing Velmans 2002]

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 18:32, 13 December 2012 (UTC)

Richardbrucebaxter: Adding Clark as a reference is an improvement. That Baumeister is used a lot seems to be a point not at issue. The horrible mangling of text remains to obscure any divination of meaning. Brews ohare (talk) 19:23, 13 December 2012 (UTC)

I've tried to do something with one of your paragraphs. The rest defy my efforts altogether. Brews ohare (talk) 22:05, 13 December 2012 (UTC)

I am OK with your latest changes here (13 Dec 2012), apart these minor discrepancies;

- "and discussion of any specific constraints missed the big picture" - but "determinism" is a specific constraint and is described as such in the introduction.

- Norretranders is not referring to the hard problem of consciousness as discussed in this paragraph but conscious states and the belief in consciousness itself - which has observable consequences in the individual and therefore society - hence my clarification "Even the material representation of" consciousness...

I am looking forward to some feedback from Pfhorrest etc, on how to proceed with this section. It is extremely difficult to encapsulate all major perspectives on free will, and their respective limitations - all in a word limited overview - while respecting their relative prominence in the literature, and not introducing any amount of bias towards any particular view point. (NB To compare what it would look like when compressed, I have created a trial version of the free will article with quotations moved to the footnotes - quotations whose point has not already been explained in the text, or which does not represent a form of the free will position being discussed [1]).

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 08:54, 14 December 2012 (UTC)

- Norretranders: I agree with you about what this author is talking about, but to me the terminology "Even the material representation of" appears to me to limit his views to neuroscience, while in fact they include the subjective aspects as well. Brews ohare (talk) 16:22, 14 December 2012 (UTC)

- determinism as a particular constraint. I see there is a problem in wording here that I have not solved. My idea was that specific constraints like addiction that have only a narrow application to a particular problem could be distinguished from the very broad view of determinism that, regardless of whatever particular form it might take in a particular area, future states are determined by past states. According to determinism, neuroscience is just one embodiment or realization of the general control of causality. Brews ohare (talk) 16:33, 14 December 2012 (UTC)

I'm not dead

Just letting everyone know that I'm still around and skimming the progress happening here, I'm just really, really busy and barely even have time to talk, and since most of what's been happening hasn't been right in the lede I haven't felt the urgency to intervene immediately, except for some lede modifications tonight which I've tried to rework more along lines previously discussed. I have some doubts about what's happening elsewhere in the article too (e.g. in the Western Philosophy section) but I'll have to comment on that in more detail later when I have the time to look it over well. --Pfhorrest (talk) 08:25, 13 December 2012 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: As you know, I don't think well advised your insistence on throwing determinism at the reader in the second sentence of the lead, a term that has at least a dozen meanings of which the one stated is a very restricted one that I would claim is prima facie nonsense today. (For example, see Nagel.) Still, given these predilections of yours, your changes are a good compromise. Brews ohare (talk) 16:27, 13 December 2012 (UTC)

The focus on the constraint of determinism in the introduction is not predilection of Pfhorrest, but is rather, as far as I am aware, the recommendation of all other editors here - and is a direct consequence of free will's discussion in the literature (including the historic framework). In my opinion, even with your changes so far accepted, the introduction has shifted away from an explanation of the philosophical problem of free will, including the dominant definitions thereof (positions held), and now risks presenting itself as a disjointed thesis on the practicality of considering it an important issue to begin with (verging on pragmatism or advertisement). NB Pfhorrest appears to have recognised this problem also with his embedded comment: "Insert paragraph summarizing history of the debate". Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 12:12, 14 December 2012 (UTC)

The rather miniscule group of "other editors here" is not a strong support for slanting the article in the direction of a discussion of a particular meaning of determinism among many, and one that was formulated by Laplace centuries ago. This idea of determinism is archaic and trivially shown to be inapplicable to any part of reality. I have tried to open this discussion, but it has been steadfastly avoided here.

Besides the irrelevance of this particular definition of determinism, focus upon it directs attention toward the the chimera of determinism, and away from the important activities in this area today, related to the careful examination by neuroscience of constraints, and the philosophical concerns about causality and the completeness of scientific explanation.

I don't expect agreement from you, but these points should not be downplayed. Brews ohare (talk) 16:14, 14 December 2012 (UTC)

As you may be aware, my particular prejudice would be to formulate the article as about constraints and to treat determinism as the ultimate version of this approach, in which all the particular constraints are just examples of the one huge overriding constraint that past states decide future states; that is, neuroscience is just a little topic in the big picture. Brews ohare (talk) 16:39, 14 December 2012 (UTC)

If the article is to stick to the focus on determinism, it should use a more general formulation such as "past states determine future states" and explain that a "state" is a general description that includes modern physical theories and their probabilistic aspects, and that the logical implication of a future state does not imply a practical capacity to determine by measurement the exact prevailing conditions today that will exactly determine the state of tomorrow. Brews ohare (talk) 16:46, 14 December 2012 (UTC)

I've taken the bold step of proposing such a change in the Introduction. Brews ohare (talk) 17:45, 14 December 2012 (UTC)

I hope you will pardon my temerity, but it appears rather likely that I will be site banned for my discussions here with you, so I thought I'd present my case for your future deliberations. Brews ohare (talk) 18:32, 14 December 2012 (UTC)

Intermediate Clean-up

For both article compression and neutrality purposes (to not over-emphasise particular points of view), I suggest removing one or more block quotes. For example, I have created an example of what the article looks like when it is compressed here [2] (from talk section Purpose of paring down In Western philosophy above). This represents a trial version of the free will article with quotations moved to the footnotes - quotations whose point has not already been explained in the text itself, or which does not represent a form of the free will position currently being discussed (as per its section name). Please let us know what you think - Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 09:35, 16 December 2012 (UTC)

Whether quotes are better in the text or in a footnote or left out altogether is probably a case-by-case decision.

Meaningful condensation of the article requires an outline and examination of linked articles for content to see what can be transferred to them or already exists there.

Pfhorrest has begun to outline. Brews ohare (talk) 16:00, 16 December 2012 (UTC)

Perhaps as part of the outlining procedure, a selection of articles to link to could be made. That would help to identify areas in Free will from which chunks of text could be exported, or perhaps eliminated altogether if adequate discussion already exists elsewhere?

A probable headache with this process is that changes to other articles may result in turf wars in some cases. That may mean that consolidation will not work for some topics. Brews ohare (talk) 16:38, 16 December 2012 (UTC)

A disjointed thesis

Hi Richard: To quote you above:

"with your changes so far accepted, the introduction has shifted away from an explanation of the philosophical problem of free will, including the dominant definitions thereof (positions held), and now risks presenting itself as a disjointed thesis on the practicality of considering it an important issue to begin with (verging on pragmatism or advertisement)."

Although the adjective "disjointed" is not good, attempting to explain "the practicality of considering it an important issue to begin with" strikes me as a reasonable undertaking for an introduction. The "explanation of the philosophical problem of free will" is your major interest, but I think we all can agree with several published comments about this matter, that it tends to be a rather arcane preoccupation of academia. This topic has to face the challenge to arouse enough interest in the reader to motivate learning a lot of distinctions that tend to make the head buzz. On the other hand, the practical issues related to the realization that there are constraints upon free will and they have implications for ethics, the law, and for medical treatment require little persuasion and don't need a lot of hairsplitting terminology. Brews ohare (talk) 18:12, 14 December 2012 (UTC)

We definitely maintain a different stance on this issue. I would rather let the philosophers decide on what classifies as hairsplitting terminology - and I am not sure on what basis we can assume otherwise (unless we have references to support their models are not maintained by individuals in society). Basically, our presentation has to represent the literature - and this prevents the overstating of something in the introduction which has not yet been defined (ie, the historic definitions have not yet been espoused). I would rather keep this article as "free will in philosophy", and create other articles if needs be. NB it has already been declared as too long (which for reference was one reason why it lost its feature article status) Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 13:00, 15 December 2012 (UTC)

The division into several articles is a possibility. A disambiguation page could be made with Free will (philosophy)', Free will (antiquity), Free will (neuroscience) - suggestions?

An alternative approach that I prefer would be to make more use of the already very, very, very many existing articles on things like Determinism, Indeterminism, Causal determinism, Biological determinism, Environmental determinism, Social determinism, Technological determinism, Theological determinism, Genetic determinism, Biological determination (sociology), Neuroscience of free will, Mental causation, Causality, Volition (psychology), Incompatibilism, Compatibilism, Fate, Libertarianism (metaphysics), Hard incompatibilism, Free will in antiquity, Mind-body problem, Omniscience, Dilemma of determinism, Free will in theology, Voluntarism (metaphysics), Hard problem of consciousness, Predestination, Radical behaviorism, Sociocultural evolution, and heaven knows how many more. There is a nucleus for this approach in the section High level determinism and free will. The Free will article would be more useful if it served as guidance to all these other articles and removed Free will's excess of details to separate articles. This approach also would lead to more attention for this myriad of other articles, many of which need a lot of work that now is spent here trying to do what they should be doing. Brews ohare (talk) 17:44, 15 December 2012 (UTC)

I'd hazard that greater reliance upon other articles would have another good effect upon Free will in giving us room to think more broadly and present a fuller picture from a more elevated stance. Brews ohare (talk) 17:54, 15 December 2012 (UTC)

I don't support the forking of the article (and in fact don't see the point of having Free will in antiquity as a separate article... we don't have, for instance, Ethics in antiquity, or any other era-separation of other philosophical topics, despite that the issues discussed have shifted dramatically over the centuries). However, I do support the idea of going into less detail here on all of the issues that already have their own articles. However, this seemed to cause problems for you; when you came here, the lede just said "determinism", and you got all confused about all sorts of things because of that, so it was expanded to specify a particular kind of determinism and go on to define what that was, which really shouldn't have been necessary, and even you have complained afterward that it's "going into determinism" too soon.

The article, especially the lede, should be as concise as possible, summary-style, and if we think someone may not understand a concept being used, wikilink it! That's what a wiki is for. --Pfhorrest (talk) 21:04, 15 December 2012 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: I'm unsure why you single out the existing article Free will in antiquity as unnecessary: was your point that many of these articles overlap and could be eliminated or consolidated? Whether an article is unnecessary is probably a question of whether the detail it contains on its sub-topic is too much to shoe-horn into a more general article, don't you think? Brews ohare (talk) 15:46, 16 December 2012 (UTC)

This appears to be what happens when we ignore the philosophical positions and their clear categorisation [3] - people become confused. Basically the philosophy has developed as such for a reason, and any attempt at promoting an alternate system of review risks failure. I think we need to take immediate steps to correct this, and plan to do so shortly.

On another issue, Pfhorrest I am personally OK with your edit shifting the introductory explanation of determinism to the footnote [4], but I think this may not be best for the standard user in terms of their understanding. It also appears to overweight the alternate positions, but this is a separate issue.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 12:00, 17 December 2012 (UTC)

Richard, I gather you have reservations about the article and indeed the entire complex of philosophical articles linked above. However, I don't understand what you mean by "ignoring the categorization of positions". Is this a plea for Free will to provide better guidance to the many other articles? I also don't understand what "an alternate system of review" means. Does this mean that the present organization of Free will is the best we can do? These two interpretations of your remarks are at odds, so I'm not getting it. Brews ohare (talk) 13:10, 17 December 2012 (UTC)

I am referring to the introduction, which is what this Talk section was originally about (I have modified the indenting to reflect this). Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 14:08, 17 December 2012 (UTC)

Regarding the Introductory paragraph, I'd say its big forward step is to open the subject up and not crowd it into a narrow box with nomological determinism, possibly the silliest form of determinism imaginable. That allows a lot more room for further development later on. Probably the first footnote about some caveats of determinism could be removed and the subject introduced where it can be put into the text. Brews ohare (talk) 14:04, 17 December 2012 (UTC)

Determinism

What do the various articles on determinism say? Below is a list of 29 related articles (Free will is counted) with excerpts from them indicating their subjects. It would be useful to look these over and decide just how the article Free will relates to them, whether stuff could be transferred to them to shorten up Free will and whether Free will can give some perspective upon them.

• Determinism a philosophy stating that for everything that happens there are conditions such that, given those conditions, nothing else could happen. 158767 views in last 90 days #4
• Causal determinism: Causal (or Nomological) determinism[3] proposes that the future is determined by preceding events, perhaps of recent occurrence, while the related 4043 views #24
• Predeterminism proposes that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to the origin of the universe. 7178 views #21
• Dilemma of determinism: the claim that if determinism is true, our actions are controlled by preceding events and thus we are not free; and that if indeterminism is true, our actions are random and we are likewise not free; and that as determinism and indeterminism exhaust the logical possibilities, free will is thus logically impossible. 7388 views #19
• Biological determinism: the interpretation of humans and human life from a strictly biological point of view & the hypothesis that biological factors such as an organism's individual genes (as opposed to social or environmental factors) completely determine how a system behaves or changes over time. 20379 views #14
• Biological determination (sociology): The principle that behavioral differences are the result of inherited physical characteristics. 900 views #27
• Genetic determinism: the belief that genes, along with environmental conditions, determine morphological and behavioral phenotypes. The term is sometimes mistakenly applied to the unscientific belief that genes determine, to the exclusion of environmental influence, how an organism turns out. 8687 views #18
• Environmental determinism: aspects of physical geography, particularly climate, influenced the psychological mind-set of individuals, which in turn defined the behaviour and culture of the society that those individuals formed. 27944 views #10
• Social determinism: the theory that social interactions and constructs alone determine individual behavior (as opposed to biological or objective factors). 7014 views #22
• Sociobiology: contends genes explain specific human behaviours, although sociobiologists describe this role as a very complex and often unpredictable interaction between nature and nurture 35266 #8
• Neoevolutionism: neoevolutionism discards the determinism argument and introduces probability, arguing that accidents and free will have much impact on the process of social evolution 5562 views #23
• Technological determinism: presumes that a society's technology drives the development of its social structure and cultural values 34379 views #9
• Theological determinism: all events that happen are pre-ordained, or predestined to happen, by a monotheistic God. 3522 views #25
• Free will in theology: if God knows exactly what will happen (right down to every choice a person makes) it would seem the "freedom" of these choices is called into question. 17483 views #15
• Neuroscience of free will: whether, and in what sense, rational agents exercise control over their actions or decisions. 24083 views #12
• Problem of mental causation: how to account for the common-sense idea that intentional thoughts or intentional mental states are causes of intentional actions. 2449 views #26
• Hard problem of consciousness: the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences — how sensations acquire characteristics, such as colors and tastes 25459 views #11
• Mind-body problem: the relationship between consciousness and the brain. The question, as Colin McGinn puts it, is how "technicolour phenomenology [can] arise from soggy grey matter." 13732 views #17
• Voluntarism (metaphysics): a school of thought that regards the will as superior to the intellect and to emotion 7295 views #20
• Destiny: a predetermined course of events. It may be conceived as a predetermined future, whether in general or of an individual. It is a concept based on the belief that there is a fixed natural order to the cosmos. 129277 views #5
• Predestination: in theology, is the doctrine that all events have been willed by God. Explanations of predestination often seek to address the so-called "paradox of free will," whereby God's omniscience seems incompatible with human free will. 86941 views #6
• Causality: the relationship between an event (the cause) and a second event (the effect), where the second event is understood as a consequence of the first 171871 views #2
• Causalism: holds behavior and actions to be the result of previous mental states, such as beliefs, desires, or intentions, rather than from a present conscious will guiding one's actions. 550 views #29
• Causality (physics): the relationship between causes and effects. 21039 views #2
• Behaviorism: behaviors as such can be described scientifically without recourse either to internal physiological events or to hypothetical constructs such as thoughts and beliefs. 204509 views #1
• Radical behaviorism: the position that the science of behavior is a natural science, a belief that animal behavior can be studied profitably and compared with human behavior, a strong emphasis on the environment as cause of behavior, and a penchant for operationalizing. It has a tendency to apply notions of reinforcement to philosophy and daily life and, particularly, an emphasis on private experience. 16224 views #16
• Omniscience: Whether omniscience, particularly regarding the choices that a human will make, is compatible with free will has been debated by theists and philosophers. 83444 views #7
• Theological fatalism: The argument that divine foreknowledge is not compatible with free will is known as theological fatalism. 895 views #28

• Free will: 164482 views in last 90 days #3 in number of views in last 90 days

Brews ohare (talk) 02:31, 19 December 2012 (UTC)

List in order of number of views in last 90 days, most views at the top:

1. Behaviorism 204509
2. Causality 171871
3. Free will 164482
4. Determinism 158767
5. Destiny 129277
6. Predestination86941
7. Omniscience 83444
8. Sociobiology 35266
9. Technological determinism 34379
10. Environmental determinism 27944
11. Hard problem of consciousness 25459
12. Neuroscience of free will 24083
13. Causality (physics) 21039
14. Biological determinism 20379
15. Free will in theology 17483
16. Radical behaviorism 16224
17. Mind-body problem 13732
18. Genetic determinism 8687
19. Dilemma of determinism 7388
20. Voluntarism (metaphysics) 7295
21. Predeterminism 7178
22. Social determinism 7014
23. Neoevolutionism 5562
24. Causal determinism 4043
25. Theological determinism 3522
26. Problem of mental causation 2449
27. Biological determination (sociology) 900
28. Theological fatalism 895
29. Causalism 550

Brews ohare (talk) 02:35, 19 December 2012 (UTC)

One thing I want to call attention to, in case anyone was thinking of trying to distill some all-encompassing definition of determinism out of the quotes above: note that there are two broad sorts of "determinisms" discussed in them -- one type saying "everything in the future is already fixed by X" and one saying "all phenomena of type Y are determined only by events of type Z". Nomological determinism, theological determinism, and logical determinism all fit into the first pattern, and that kind of determinism is the kind which incompatibilism is concerned with, and what is generally understood by "determinism" simpliciter in discussions of free will. The latter patter is what biological determinism, cultural determinism, technological determinism, etc, fit into, and say only that the only causal factors affecting certain phenomena are specific other phenomena -- but not that everything that will ever happen is already fixed by some overarching thing or another. --Pfhorrest (talk) 03:25, 19 December 2012 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: Good points not evident in the article Free will at the moment. I'm hazarding a guess that the top dozen or so articles in terms of hits are topics that many readers would like to see carefully related to Free will. Brews ohare (talk) 05:04, 19 December 2012 (UTC)

I think this is a very nice analysis by Pfhorrest. I believe that people understand what is generally meant by unqualified determinism (and if not the determinism article makes this relatively clear), but I have appreciated recent efforts to explicate this in the introduction. I think the main confusion that has arisen here has been product of a) recent upgrades to the introduction (e.g. compatibilism articulated physical constraint but not incompatibilism leading to [5]), and b) the conglomeration of causal determinism with theological determinism in the definition of compatibilism/incompatibilism (which is a direct by product of higher level determinism having the capacity to place restrictions on free will irrespective of freedom from lower level causal determinism). Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 06:16, 19 December 2012 (UTC)

Classification of articles on determinism

I thought I'd try classifying the articles using Pfhorrest's two types of determinism: determinism of the Universe and determinism of particular parts of the Universe. The first category, of course, proposes that the second category exists.

Free will, pertaining to events of consciousness, refers to a limited sphere of the Universe's many activities, but asks how the two relate. So from the viewpoint of determinism, it straddles the fence, considering all types.

Thus, in terms of relevance to Free will I guess we need to ask whether articles about "determinism of the Universe" are grist for the incompatibilist camp leaving "determinism of particular parts of the Universe" in the compatibilist camp, discussing particular constraints.

I thought this might be a useful categorization of the articles. Some articles are in a gray area and appear in both lists. In order of decreasing interest by readers here is how that looks:

• Everything in the future is already fixed by X; incompatibilism can use these ideas

1. Behaviorism: behaviors as such can be described scientifically without recourse either to internal physiological events or to hypothetical constructs such as thoughts and beliefs. 204509 views

4. Determinism a philosophy stating that for everything that happens there are conditions such that, given those conditions, nothing else could happen.

5. Destiny: a predetermined course of events. It may be conceived as a predetermined future, whether in general or of an individual. It is a concept based on the belief that there is a fixed natural order to the cosmos.

6. Predestination: in theology, is the doctrine that all events have been willed by God. Explanations of predestination often seek to address the so-called "paradox of free will," whereby God's omniscience seems incompatible with human free will.

7. Omniscience: Whether omniscience, particularly regarding the choices that a human will make, is compatible with free will has been debated by theists and philosophers.

8. Sociobiology: contends genes explain specific human behaviours, although sociobiologists describe this role as a very complex and often unpredictable interaction between nature and nurture

12. Neuroscience of free will: whether, and in what sense, rational agents exercise control over their actions or decisions.

13. Causality (physics): the relationship between causes and effects

14. Biological determination (sociology): The principle that behavioral differences are the result of inherited physical characteristics

15. Free will in theology: if God knows exactly what will happen (right down to every choice a person makes) it would seem the "freedom" of these choices is called into question.

19. Dilemma of determinism: the claim that if determinism is true, our actions are controlled by preceding events and thus we are not free; and that if indeterminism is true, our actions are random and we are likewise not free; and that as determinism and indeterminism exhaust the logical possibilities, free will is thus logically impossible

21. Predeterminism proposes that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to the origin of the universe.

• All phenomena of type Y are determined only by events of type Z; compatibilism can use these ideas as the use of determinism is limited in scope

2. Causality: the relationship between an event (the cause) and a second event (the effect), where the second event is understood as a consequence of the first This article is 'way too narrow and omits all but one view of causality

9. Technological determinism: presumes that a society's technology drives the development of its social structure and cultural values

10. Environmental determinism: aspects of physical geography, particularly climate, influenced the psychological mind-set of individuals, which in turn defined the behaviour and culture of the society that those individuals formed.

11. Hard problem of consciousness: the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences — how sensations acquire characteristics, such as colors and tastes

12. Neuroscience of free will: whether, and in what sense, rational agents exercise control over their actions or decisions.

13. Causality (physics): the relationship between causes and effects

14. Biological determination (sociology): The principle that behavioral differences are the result of inherited physical characteristics

16. Radical behaviorism: the position that the science of behavior is a natural science, a belief that animal behavior can be studied profitably and compared with human behavior, a strong emphasis on the environment as cause of behavior, and a penchant for operationalizing. It has a tendency to apply notions of reinforcement to philosophy and daily life and, particularly, an emphasis on private experience.

17. Mind-body problem: the relationship between consciousness and the brain.

18. Genetic determinism: the belief that genes, along with environmental conditions, determine morphological and behavioral phenotypes. The term is sometimes mistakenly applied to the unscientific belief that genes determine, to the exclusion of environmental influence, how an organism turns out

20. Voluntarism (metaphysics): a school of thought that regards the will as superior to the intellect and to emotion

22. Social determinism: the theory that social interactions and constructs alone determine individual behavior (as opposed to biological or objective factors).

23. Neoevolutionism: neoevolutionism discards the determinism argument and introduces probability, arguing that accidents and free will have much impact on the process of social evolution

Such a listing can't be fixed in stone as nuances of treatment are ignored. I hope it might be a starting point for some thought about how the articles might be woven into Free will. Brews ohare (talk) 17:49, 19 December 2012 (UTC)

Types of determinism

determinism of the Universe and determinism of particular parts of the Universe. The first category, of course, proposes that the second category exists. I'm not certain exactly what you're trying to say here, but it doesn't sound correct to me. The first broad type of determinism says "anything that happens, could not have possibly happened any other way, because X". The second broad type of determinism says "whenever anything of type Y happens, it does so if and only if the right things of type Z happened". The first does not imply any specific connections between specific types of phenomena; only that all phenomena happen exactly as they happen and could not have happened any other way, because of some X that has somehow already plotted out the course of the entire future.

The second conversely does not imply that any particular phenomena of type Y that happen were the only phenomena of that type that could have happened; just that phenomena of type Y are caused entirely by phenomena of type Z, which may or may not be able to happen other than they do.

For an example of the second without the first: in sociology, one could hold to technological determinism, saying that cultural and social structures are determined by the available technology, and yet not hold that the particular march of technology we've seen was inevitable and couldn't have happened any other way; just that, if it had happened another way, culture and society would have happened differently as well, because they are determined by the technology.

For an example of the first without the second: one could hold to nomological determinism, saying that the entire future unfolds inevitable and necessarily and couldn't happen any other way, but deny that biology is the sole determining factor of human thought and action, to the exclusion of e.g. social conditioning, learning more generally, or reflexive process like self-awareness and self-control. Such a person would say we still can't help thinking and doing what we are determined to, but if counterfactually one of those non-biological factors were to be different, then our thoughts and actions would vary with them, because they are not determined solely by biology.

As a more specific critique of your lists here, I'd say the "Sociobiology", "Neuroscience of free will", and "Biological determination" entries don't belong in the first group but rather the second; and conversely both listings of "Causality" in the second belong rather in the first (and numerous others in the second are of dubious relation to the issues of determinism at all, such as "Hard problem of consciousness", "Mind-body problem", and "Voluntarism"). --Pfhorrest (talk) 02:03, 20 December 2012 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: The point isn't to argue over classification but to see how Free will can make use of these articles and help the reader to make sense of WP's widely scattered treatment. As for the categories, it seems to me you are shifting ground. The original statement: Everything in the future is already fixed by X seemed to me to stress everything, while the second All phenomena of type Y are determined only by events of type Z seemed to me to suggest some things Y were determined by Z but ostensibly others were not, and might not be determined at all. I don't know that any of this matters to the revision, but maybe you can credit me a little more analytic ability than your wont. Brews ohare (talk) 06:19, 20 December 2012 (UTC)

I am emphasizing this point because your misunderstanding of it seems to have been the root of much of the confusion we have been going over for the past long while, so it's important to make sure that we really have it clear before moving forward any more.

I don't see where I'm shifting ground between those two statements, considering they were made at the same time and are meant to distinguish between two different kinds of things. Oone saying that whatever happens, necessarily happens and couldn't happen any other way; the other saying that if a certain kind of thing happens, it's because another certain kind of thing happened, and will only happen differently if that other thing happens differently.

One is about the possibility of alternatives in general -- and that's the one that incompatibilists are concerned about, what all the hubbub about free will has been about for thousands of years, and what "determinism" simpliciter is almost universally understood to mean in the context of free will -- the other is just about how different kinds of phenomena relate to each other, and is just one part of a complex picture ancillary to what the rest (i.e. compatibilists) are talking about. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:10, 20 December 2012 (UTC)

My impression is that we're talking past each other, or I just don't see a lot of difference between us, while you do. As far as one definition saying everything bar none is determined, we've both said that from the outset. As far as the other saying some particular things are determined by other particular things, we've both said that. I pushed matters a bit by saying one could say "All p are caused by P", all q are caused by Q, & etc. ... and one position is that this sequence (p,P) (q,Q) ... can be continued to exhaust all things and imply that all things are determined, tantamount I'd say to implying nomological determinism (would you agree), while a second position is that this sequence cannot be so extended, which is at least a specific form of compatibilism (would you agree; it is at least a negation of the first proposition). What is more interesting is that to be consistent with science today, and avoid oversimplification, one has to be very clear about how the elements (p,P),(q,Q)..., the so-called "events", are defined. One also has to replace "cause" by something like "logically imply". That is my reading of Nagel. What do you think? Do we agree or is there more involved here? Brews ohare (talk) 16:40, 20 December 2012 (UTC)

The need for great care in how events and cause are defined suggests that one is engaged in detailed descriptions of what constitutes an "event" and how it is said to "cause" another, and raises questions of how to separate the "universe" from this detailed description. That raises some interesting questions (ontology, maybe?) that hardly begin to emerge from the grossly simplified formulation of determinism as: "the future is determined completely by preceding events". This formulation is trivially false without particularly careful definitions as outlined above, and discussed by Nagel. These deep questions escape the compatibilist, incompatibilist framework as presented in the article Free will, which dwells long on debates about hypotheticals already known to be irrelevant to the universe we live in. Brews ohare (talk) 17:09, 20 December 2012 (UTC)

My own view on this topic is that the important questions attach to the relation between science and the universe. A big issue is whether they are coextensive. Science has practical impact upon technology and our understanding of interconnections. However, there are definitely areas where science so far has had little impact. So the determinist-compatibilist difference of opinion of today can be phrased as a difference in optimism about science, with determinism opining that science will gradually extend to everything, and compatibilism opining that won't happen.

There is more than conjecture on both sides of this issue, and that is what is interesting to present in Free will. Free will is a very good arena in which to contrast these viewpoints. It involves a widely shared intuition that appears to be at variance with the scientific program, and one has to ask whether science can say anything useful about this intuition. Free will stands at the nexus between subjective and objective realities, and is possibly the most interesting situation where these two meet.

I think you, Pfhorrest, and Richardbrucebaxter, don't see it that way, and are both preoccupied with historic but outmoded disputes. Brews ohare (talk) 18:42, 20 December 2012 (UTC)

It is debatable, of course, but I'm inclined to a Popper-like view that the picture that emerges of an "event" as some kind of formalized "state" and "determines" as a "logical implication" of connection between states, all formulated by one or another abstract theory, puts a lot of emphasis upon mental constructions. From the stance of a Duhem, or a Popper, or a Hawking, the use of an intermediary like an elaborate mental construction is a meld of the subjective and objective. It is used to determine connections about objective events, but the form of the theoretical construct is a product of subjective activities, and its particular form is more about the brain than anything else. Just like a computer algorithm can be expressed in C or in Fortran, some aspects of the universe's operation can be expressed in various mental constructs. Brews ohare (talk) 19:12, 20 December 2012 (UTC)

Quoting Feynman about his creative process: "It is impossible to differentiate the symbols from the thing; but it is very visual. It is hard to believe it, but I see these things not as mathematical expressions but a mixture of a mathematical expression wrapped into and around, in a vague way, around the object. So I see all the time visual things associated with what I am trying to do." Silvan S. Schweber (1994). QED and the men who made it: Dyson, Feynman, Schwinger, and Tomonaga. Princeton University Press. p. 465. ISBN 0691033277. A more technical description is provided by Adrian Wüthrich (2010). The Genesis of Feynman Diagrams. Springer. p. 9. ISBN 9048192277.

Feynman saw wavefunctions, Mozart saw music, all of us see free will... Some of us have intuitions about wavefunctions, some of us follow Eine kleine Nachtmusik, most of us intuit free will. Brews ohare (talk) 19:31, 20 December 2012 (UTC)

Remaining uses of Hard Determinism in article

With respect to the previous clarification of "hard determinism" in section Hard determinism (to a be position with respect to "nomological determinism" rather than any form of determinism) - there are some remaining ambiguities on the site. For example; the caption "Hard Martin Luther was a hard determinist". Is it correct that he believed in nomological determinism? Wouldn't it be more correct to say he accepted a form of theological (pre)determinism (and with respect to incompatibilism that would make him a hard incompatibilist)? Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 11:14, 7 December 2012 (UTC)

Actually, this is something I've been kind of overlooking until we got all the rest of this sorted out... but nomological determinism really it a little to narrow for the kind of determinism we want to be talking about, for exactly this reason: we're excluding the quite notable theological issues (as another editor from WP:PHIL commented on earlier). We narrowed in on nomological determinism to be clear that we weren't talking about things like biological or cultural or psychological determinism -- about whether specific things are caused entirely by specific other things -- but what we really want is something broader which encompasses nomological determinism, theological determinism, and anything else which says that for one reason or another every fact about the future is already fixed in stone now. Logical determinism is definitely broad enough to encompass both of those, but for some reason I can't quite place I'm hesitant to say lets go with that. I really think we should be able to just say "determinism", because without qualifiers that's generally understood to mean what we want here. --Pfhorrest (talk) 22:25, 7 December 2012 (UTC)

The ambiguity of physical (or nomological) versus theological determinism in the definition of compatibilism/incompatibilism appears to be an artefact of the historic debate. I think we should consider retaining nomological determinism, clarifying our use of compatibilism/incompatibilism (to be with respect to this only), and using "hard theological determinism" instead of "hard determinism" where appropriate in this article, as hard theological determinism (or theological determinism for that matter) does not appear to be relevant to the majority of the text. There are various reasons why their definitions could have been mixed (associated) - it actually fits nicely into the theory behind my hierarchical ordering of 'Free will Concepts Based On Determinism Views' - but the concepts are logically distinct. Note I recognise that this approach may not be appropriate (of ignoring theological compatibilism/incompatibilism), in which case we should instead search for a broader definition of determinism (or remove the qualifiers) as you have recommended. Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 16:01, 8 December 2012 (UTC)

I am currently looking for references that define Compatibilism, Hard Determinism, Metaphysical Libertarianism, and Hard Incompatibilism as positions regarding some more general form of determinism that encapsulates nomological, logical, and theological determinism (as opposed to nomological determinism in particular). I have found one so far. I anticipate that we will need to take steps to define these 4 positions in terms of nomological determinism specifically, at least when they are being presented together with respect to a particular (or general) form of determinism, as they are in the introduction/figure. This will be required if any one of these 4 positions is found to be nomological determinism specific (ie having a prerequisite of nomological determinism) - and metaphysical libertarianism and hard incompatibilism at least appear to be. Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 21:25, 24 December 2012 (UTC)

References

Suggestions of a more open discussion of free will

I've said before that the present structure that attempts to shoehorn a narrow view of the topic into a brief lead paragraph allows too little room for proper discussion. Although Pfhorrest is very attached to this format, a more flexible approach is a simple lead-in to individual following paragraphs that can outline matters in more detail. For example:

Free will is the ability of agents to make choices free from influence. Although we commonly believe that we are free to make choices, historically there has long been argument over the reality of this perception. In philosophy the topic of free will is concerned with the careful definition and exact nature of free will, and its limitations.

Only an example: other lead-in formulations are possible, of course. From there, the separate topics can be given full paragraphs to outline their positions and introduce the lengthy considerations of the body. Brews ohare (talk) 15:47, 8 December 2012 (UTC)

This particular issue regarding the limitations the present lead paragraph imposes upon the Introduction is only one of several. As noted, it forces a too narrow version of determinism upon the presentation. In addition, it drives the discussion toward determinism forcing other considerations to combat this prejudice. That discounts not only theology, but modern thinkers like Popper and Duhem and Hawking, and of course quite a few significant older views. The straightjacket approach should be abandoned. Brews ohare (talk) 16:58, 8 December 2012 (UTC)

Proposed new section

Subjective-objective dichotomy

A big issue is whether the world of science and the universe are coextensive.

There is a common philosophical tendency...to conceive of the realm of belief and attitude as clearly distinct from the world of objects and events. This separation is typically presented in terms of a distinction between subjective and objective ...

— J. E. Malpas, Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning: Holism, Truth, Interpretation p.192

The objective aspects of experience often are considered to lie within the domain of science. Science has practical impact upon technology and our understanding of interconnections. However, there are areas where science so far has had little impact. So the determinist-compatibilist differences of the past might be rephrased today as a difference in optimism about science, with one view opining that science will gradually extend to everything, and the opposite view opining that won't happen. For example, the statement is found in many books:

"...consciousness is a biological process that will eventually be explained in terms of molecular signaling pathways used by interacting populations of nerve cells.."

— Eric R. Kandel, In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of Mind

On the other hand, a contrary view is described by Northoff:

"Epistemically, the mind is determined by mental states, which are accessible in First-Person Perspective. In contrast, the brain, as characterized by neuronal states, can be accessed in Third-Person Perspective. The Third-Person Perspective focuses on other persons and thus on the neuronal states of others' brain while excluding the own brain. In contrast, the First-Person Perspective could potentially provide epistemic access to own brain...However, the First-Person Perspective provides access only to the own mental states but not to the own brain and its neuronal states."

— Georg Northoff, Philosophy of the Brain: The Brain Problem, p. 5

Free will is an arena in which to contrast these viewpoints. Free will is a widely shared intuition that appears to be at variance with the scientific approach (for example, see mental causation), and one has to ask whether science can say anything useful about this intuition, or does it fall under the hard problem of consciousness? Free will stands at the nexus between subjective and objective realities, and is a most interesting situation where these two meet.

Following the historic debates above, one could formulate an example pattern of propositions: "All p are determine by P", "all q are determined by Q", & etc. ... and one position is that this sequence (p,P) (q,Q) ... can be continued to exhaust all things and imply that all things are determined one way or another, tantamount to implying nomological determinism, while a second position is that this sequence cannot be so extended, which is one very specific form of compatibilism .

What is more interesting is that to be consistent with science today, and avoid oversimplification, one has to be very clear about how the events (p,P),(q,Q)..., are defined. One also has to replace "determined" by something like "logically imply".

"a theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."

— Ernest Nagel, Alternative descriptions of physical state

The need for great care in defining "events" and "determined" results in detailed descriptions of what constitutes an "event" and how one is said to "determine" another, and raises questions of how to relate the "universe" to these detailed descriptions.

These developments take the subjective-objective distinction to a more general level than simply arguments over the prospects of success in bringing certain areas of experience within the grasp of science. A Popper-like view emerges with an "event" as some kind of formalized "state" and the relationship "determines" phrased as a "logical implication" of connection between states, all combined as parts of one or another abstract theory. That formalization puts a lot of emphasis upon mental constructions. From the stance of a Duhem, or a Popper, or a Hawking, the use of an intermediary, elaborate mental construction is a meld of the subjective and objective. It is used to determine connections about objective events, but the form of the theoretical construct is a product of subjective activities, and its particular form may well be more about the brain than anything else. Just like a computer algorithm can be expressed in C or in Fortran programming languages, some aspects of the universe's operation can be expressed in various mental constructs.

It appears that some among us actually do have intuitive grasp of these creative abstractions, perhaps analogous to the fact that some among us hear music in ambient sounds. Quoting Feynman about his creative process:

It is impossible to differentiate the symbols from the thing; but it is very visual. It is hard to believe it, but I see these things not as mathematical expressions but a mixture of a mathematical expression wrapped into and around, in a vague way, around the object. So I see all the time visual things associated with what I am trying to do."

— Richard P. Feyman, As quoted by Schweber: QED and the men who made it: Dyson, Feynman, Schwinger, and Tomonaga

This comment could be paralleled by others about the intuitions of musicians and mathematicians. The point is that the creation of scientific theories is a subjective process, and the very concepts of determinism are themselves subjective and mutable creations of the human mind. What is in charge here: the intuition conceiving the theory, or the theory that results; or is it an unending back-and-forth spiral from one to the other? The question of whether an intuitive free will submits to a critique by some deterministic theory has aspects of an infinite regress. Did a rat "decide" to run a maze, or was it "instinct"? Did the biologist in the laboratory "decide" to build the maze, or was it the zeitgeist of the field? Did the corporation "decide" to build the laboratory, or was it a fad? ...

It is not possible to resolve which of the subjective or physical universes ultimately contains the other.

— Alec Rogers, Cognitive Set Theory, p.85

When stated at a general level, the subjective/objective dichotomy is recognized by most social scientists as one of the enduring metatheoretical dilemmas in the social sciences...

— David Swartz, Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, p. 55

Notes

Comments

Above is a formal presentation of my earlier remarks as a proposal for a section of Free will. Perhaps you all might help with some comments? Brews ohare (talk) 19:16, 21 December 2012 (UTC)

There being no comment about the above paragraphs, I propose to add them to the article. Brews ohare (talk) 04:23, 25 December 2012 (UTC)

I've placed a revised version of the above proposal on the main page. If there are comments upon this revision, please add them here. Brews ohare (talk) 14:37, 26 December 2012 (UTC)

The section Subjective-objective dichotomy was deleted in this edit by Richardbrucebaxter with the in-line comment I don't think this content belongs to an article on free will - it is not a standard categorisation of the problem (I suggest working in content from Velmans 2002 and other free will sources)).

This deleted material was first introduced in outline as this comment December 20, numerous requests for comment were made, and none was offered even after explicit proposal for its addition to Free will. This subsection was placed as a sub-subsection under Related philosophical issues which, in my opinion, releases it from the critique that is is not a "standard categorization" of Free will.

In any event, it seems appropriate to examine this subsection here rather than resorting to in-line commentary, which is necessarily overly-brief for such an extensive topic.

I'd be happy to discuss changes to this subsection, and perhaps Richardbrucebaxter could elaborate upon how the source (Velmans 2002) relates to the topic, as I am unfamiliar with this work. Brews ohare (talk) 18:29, 27 December 2012 (UTC)

In case the thesis of this sub-subsection is not clear, the point made is that modern version of determinism as described by Nagel, for instance, that is, one compatible with modern science and the understanding of such science, requires a rather theoretical development fastening "determinism" within an elaborate intellectual creation that results from an act of creation by a human brain, a creation whose form, as is argued by many (Duhem, Popper, Hawking, maybe Chomsky) is connected to the way that brain functions. This theoretical construction is related to reality somewhat like the way assembly language peculiar to a particular computer is able to express a general algorithm not so constricted, by translating it into steps that a particular computer can handle. If determinism finds itself in such a context, it seems pertinent to suggest that using such theory to assess mental activity itself, including free will, is something of a bootstrapping process that might never converge. A different analogy (not so close, because it is mathematics, which is divorced from observation) is a popular view of Goedel's theorem, that a logical system contains truths that cannot be proven from within the system, but whose proof requires a higher-level system, which in turn suffers from a similar problem. Brews ohare (talk) 18:43, 27 December 2012 (UTC)

A nontechnical argument that may be more appealing is Subjective vs. Objective: What's that all about? . Brews ohare (talk) 19:26, 27 December 2012 (UTC)

A narrower, more technical usage of subjectivity-objectivity is found in Bayesian analysis, which distinguishes between using models in interpreting data or just using the data without interpretative models. See Subjective and Objective Bayesian Statistics, and Colin R Blyth. Brews ohare (talk) 19:39, 27 December 2012 (UTC)

And we have this: "There is another sense of the objective-subjective distinction, and that is the ontological sense. Some entities such as pains, tickles, and itches, have a subjective mode of existence, in the sense that they exist only as experienced by a conscious subject. Others, such as mountains, molecules, and tectonic plates, have an objective existence, in the sense that their existence does not depend upon any consciousness. The point is to call attention to the fact that the scientific requirement of epistemic objectivity does not preclude ontological subjectivity as a domain of investigation."

I'd say that this description is highly debatable and probably very wrong, but it sounds good. For instance, I'd suggest that a "tectonic plate" exists only in a theory where it is a construction supported by some observations, clearly the creation of a conscious entity. Also, an itch may be scratched entirely subconsciously, requiring no conscious entity to experience it, though a third party would conclude an itch occurred. Bohr, Northoff and others would argue that indeed "epistemic objectivity" in at least some meanings of that term does indeed "preclude ontological subjectivity as a domain for investigation". Something has to be explained in Free will. Brews ohare (talk) 19:53, 27 December 2012 (UTC)

Arbitrary reversions without discussion by RIchardbrucebaxter

Richard: you have now reverted twice (here and again here) a Subjective-objective dichotomy sub-subsection on Free will that I posted on the Talk page over a week ago, following a request for commentary that you refused. You have avoided questions I raised above about your first reversion.

With your second reversion, you have again avoided any engagement on the Talk page.

That behavior doesn't help with a positive development of this topic. I gather that you simply do not wish to discuss the matter, and have decided not to say so, not to give some reasons on the Talk page, but instead to edit war. Why? Why not engage in some development of the topic and describe the relevance of the reference you mentioned, as I have requested, and indicate how you think the topic should be presented? Brews ohare (talk) 05:52, 28 December 2012 (UTC)

I am not avoiding discussion - I just don't have the amount of time required to administer your edits. I wouldn't expect any other editor to take up this role either, although Pfhorrest does an amazing (almost unbelievable) job at this. What I would like to see in general is a higher regard for accuracy, relevance, and neutrality. Please don't take things personal, but I think it is important that we work towards common standards for this encyclopaedia. Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 08:28, 28 December 2012 (UTC)

Richard: I gather that you find the topic Subjective-objective dichotomy not worthy of your time. That is not a valid reason to delete all reference to it. Your criticism of my contribution's "accuracy, relevance, and neutrality" could be helpful if any attempt to point out specifics were made. As for "standards for this encyclopaedia", I fail to see how your deliberate avoidance of Talk page discussion of this material contributes to building WP.

If you have some specifics as to the "accuracy, relevance, and neutrality" of the topic Subjective-objective dichotomy to free will, or my particular attempt to address this topic, please state them. As matters stand, there is no indication that you have any thoughts about the Subjective-objective dichotomy other than your personal belief (contrary to the literature already cited) that it is not pertinent to the subject.

You also have avoided any elucidation of your bare reference to "Velmans 2002", despite the invitation twice to do so. Perhaps you refer to this?? It appears mainly to discuss the problem of mental causation. Brews ohare (talk) 12:53, 28 December 2012 (UTC)

Actually Velman's Understanding Consciousness is a broader discussion than mental causation. He discusses (among other things) some other issues that are also discussed in the material you have removed. He has, for example, some discussion of Popper and of Hawking. Am I to conclude that if this source is referenced your objections will go away? Brews ohare (talk) 13:33, 28 December 2012 (UTC)

Below is the proposal with an introductory quote from Velmans. Velmans could be cited at other points in the subsection as well. Brews ohare (talk) 14:16, 28 December 2012 (UTC)

I am also referring to history here - but I have thought of a positive suggestion in the mean time;

You could try posting some of this content on the Talk pages of Philosophy of Mind, Subject–object problem, and philosophy of science, and see how they evaluate it.

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 23:30, 28 December 2012 (UTC)

I take this as an invitation to get lost.

Free will could be a much more useful and interesting treatment of its topic if it were more like any of the many books out there. However, it doesn't look like that will happen, and it will remain an exercise in semantics.

As the list of articles on determinism indicates, there are a huge number of articles related to this topic scattered all over WP. This proliferation of articles is more about the Balkanization of WP into separate fiefdoms than a necessity of the subject.

The formulation of many proposals for revision of this article has been interesting, though only a half-dozen or so actually affected Free will. Brews ohare (talk) 10:38, 30 December 2012 (UTC)

To go more into the fruitless semantic morass of this article on Free will: The problem with these arguments is that they all hinge upon a very restricted framework, namely a focus upon loopholes in the formulation of determinism found in physical law. This leads to a labyrinthine regress into finer and finer shades of meaning, ultimately going nowhere.

A more robust approach to this issue is to restrict the determinism of physical law to a sub-domain of events in the world. Other domains being, for example, the subjective realm of consciousness and mental activity as experienced by the one performing the acts, and the realm of mental constructs like physical theories. These last determine how we formulate matters, but are ultimately human constructions and a product of the human brain and human sensory machinery as augmented by human inventions like the Hubble telescope and the hadron collider.

Within this bigger picture it is clear that how we see the universe is severely filtered and curtailed by our ability to think (our brain can't do some things, and our brains augmented with computers can't as well) and our ability to invent augmenting machinery (our sensory apparatus is very restricted in its ability to alert us to our surroundings). There is a ton of stuff "out there" beyond our imagination and crude sensory tools with their awkward explanations of how they work, and even what we already are aware of cannot all be "explained". To claim the determinism of a physical theory applies to everything is simply hubris, a faith that this particular sort of knowledge acquiring activity ultimately will expand to include everything. And, of course, this hubris underlies the belief that the unending hairsplitting of this article on Free will is a worthwhile activity, which is quite simply ridiculous from the stance of a Popper, a Duhem, or a Hawking. Brews ohare (talk) 20:30, 30 December 2012 (UTC)

These remarks are from a particular POV of course. However, the article Free will does not adequately present this viewpoint. Brews ohare (talk) 14:54, 31 December 2012 (UTC)