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Battle of Normandy

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Main articles: Operation Pointblank and Normandy Landings

The Luftwaffe was put under massive pressure during March – April 1944. Fighter pilot losses were unbearable. According to a report made by Adolf Galland, General der Jagdflieger, on 27 April 1944, 500 aircraft and 400 pilots had been lost in the previous ten operations.[1] Galland also said that in the previous four months 1,000 pilots had been killed. Galland reported that the enemy outnumbered his fighters between 6:1 and 8:1 and the standard of Allied fighter pilot training was "astonishingly high".[2] Some 25 percent of the German fighter pilot force had been lost in May 1944 alone, while 50 percent of the available fighters were also each month from March–May 1944.[3] Galland recognised the Luftwaffe was losing the attrition war and pushed for a focus on quality rather than quantity. Galland stated in his 27 April report, "I would at this moment rather have one Me 262 in action than five Bf 109s. I used to say three 109s, but the situation develops and changes."[2] After the war Galland commented on the Luftwaffe's war over Normandy:

Whenever a fighter rolled out of its camouflaged lair, an enemy immediately pounced on it. The danger of being detected and destroyed by the enemy was ever present. At last we retired to the forests. Before and after each sortie the aircraft we rolled in and out of their leafy protection with great difficulties and much damage. Fourteen days after the invasion the units had sunk so low in their fighting strength that neither by driving the personnel nor by material replacements could they be put on their legs again.[4]

German Focke-Wulf Fw 190A shot down by a fighter of the USAAF XIX Tactical Air Command in 1944 or 1945

By May 1944 American bomber losses began to drop, while German losses soared. The Luftwaffe wrote off 50.4 percent of its force in that month and lost 25 percent of their Bf 109 and Fw 190 pilots. In the first five months the number of pilots killed in action stood at 2,262. On 31 December 1943 the Luftwaffe had 2,395 single-engine fighter pilots (1,491 fully combat ready, 291 partially combat ready and the rest non-combat ready). The crew losses for that five month period came close to 100 percent of the entire single-engine day force.[5] The Luftwaffe also undertook the defense of German occupied France during the Normandy Landings in June 1944. Despite the popular myth of Josef Priller and his wingman flying the only sortie over the beachheads on D-Day, over 170 fighter missions were made to support the ground defenses. This was a token defense to the aerial effort of the Allies who flew some 14,000 sorties over Normandy on 6 June 1944.[6] Within 36 hours of the invasion some 200 Bf 109 and Fw 190 Gruppen had been flown in as reinforcements. Due to the dearth of specialized strike aircraft the Luftwaffe was forced to fit its fighters with bomb racks. With little training in ground attack missions losses were high.[6] The OKL constantly shifted its priorities and did not make it easy for the frontline units. After the failure of ground strike missions the fighter units were ordered to maintain air superiority, which was now the main objective. The German Jagdgruppen were heavily outnumbered, and losses soared. In the period 6–30 June, German fighter losses numbered 931 losses in 13,829 sorties. The Allied air fleets flew 130,000 missions in support of the invasion.[7] Desperate efforts were made to stabilize the German fighter numbers in the face of appalling losses but the introduction of poorly skilled trainee pilots served to increase the losses further. By the time of the German defeat in August 1944, most fighter unit strength returns recorded just single figures.[8]

II dump

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Diversion to Normandy

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German Focke-Wulf Fw 190A shot down by a fighter of the USAAF XIX Tactical Air Command in 1944 or 1945

Harris and Spaatz opposed the switching of their respective commands to support the invasion in Normandy. Harris was particularly angered by this move. The proposal by the Americans to unite the 8AF and 15 AF under the same commander was seen by the British as a threat to the independence of Bomber Command.[9][10] Nevertheless, while Bomber Command retained its independence at the operational level, Portal forced Harris to turn part of the strategic bomber force to support Dwight D. Eisenhower's preliminary plan for Operation Overlord. Eisenhower called for a transportation plan to destroy all marshalling yards and rolling stock in German occupied France. During May – June 1944 RAF Bomber Command and the USAAF strategic air forces carried out the destruction of these _targets. Some 12,000 French and Belgian civilians were killed in these attacks.[11] While the night skies over France were quiet most of the time, on occasion the Luftwaffe inflicted heavy casualties. In June 1944 Bomber Command was also ordered to attack oil _targets in the Ruhr. Heavy losses ensued and morale dropped. Bomber Command's casualties were now higher the British Army in Normandy.[12] On 11 September 1944 the Supreme Allied Command returned Bomber Command to Portal's control.

For the Germans, Normandy was also an unwelcome diversion of resources. The Luftwaffe was put under severe pressure during March – April 1944. According to a report made by Adolf Galland, General der Jagdflieger, on 27 April 1944, 500 aircraft and 400 pilots had been lost in the previous ten operations.[1] Galland also said that in the previous four months 1,000 pilots had been killed. Galland reported that the enemy outnumbered his fighters between 6:1 and 8:1 and the standard of Allied fighter pilot training was "astonishingly high".[2] Some 25 percent of the German fighter pilot force had been lost in May 1944 alone, while 50 percent of the available fighters were also each month from March–May 1944.[13] Galland recognised the Luftwaffe was losing the attrition war and pushed for a focus on quality rather than quantity. Galland stated in his 27 April report, "I would at this moment rather have one Me 262 in action than five Bf 109s. I used to say three 109s, but the situation develops and changes."[2]

Normandy served only to increase attrition rates. German Jagdgruppen were heavily outnumbered, and losses soared. In the period 6–30 June, German fighter losses numbered 931 losses in 13,829 sorties.[14] Desperate efforts were made to stabilize the German fighter numbers in the face of appalling losses but the introduction of poorly skilled trainee pilots served to increase the losses further. By the time of the German defeat in August 1944, most fighter unit strength returns recorded just single figures.[15]

Post-war assessment

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The Allied offensive has often been criticised for failing to halt the mass increase in production in 1944. It has also been pointed out that German morale never came close to cracking under the weight of the bombing offensive.[16]

The German war economy did indeed expand significantly following Albert Speer’s appointment as Reichsminister of Armaments, but it did not mean that because production increased, the bombing had no real impact. The bombing offensive did do serious damage to German production levels. German tank and aircraft production, though reached new records in production levels in 1944, was in particular one-third lower than planned. The offensive had prevented German production levels from being higher.[16] German aircraft production for 1945 was planned at 80,000, which gives an idea of direction Erhard Milch and the German planners were pushing. Unhindered by Allied bombing German production would have risen far higher.[17] The United States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that strategic bombing of the German aircraft industry caused a direct and indirect loss of production amounting to approximately 18,000 aircraft between July 1943 and December 1944.[18] Reported production for the same period totalled 53,000 aircraft. The 18,000 lost represented 25 percent of overall production in this period. Of the estimated production loss, roughly 78 percent, or 14,000 aircraft, were fighters.[19]

Albert Speer estimated the bombing caused a 31 percent shortfall in aircraft by February 1945. Trucks and tank production was in shortfall by 42 and 35 percent respectively. Part of this shortfall was due to poor morale, displayed in high levels of absenteeism among German workers, in particular female workers who comprised 51 percent of the industrial workforce in 1944.[20] Some 23,000 vehicles were destroyed on the production lines between June and December 1944. The significant shortfalls of motor vehicles damaged the mobility of German Army units, in particular the Panzer Divisions.[21] Bombing had kept the expansion of German industrial output to manageable proportions for the Allies.[22][23]

The bombing also diverted German resources from the frontlines, which became increasingly overstretched. By 1944 33 percent of German artillery production and 20 percent of its ammunition were given to combat the air offensive. At the same time, some two million Germans were employed in aircraft defence work. The bombing also crucially destroyed the Luftwaffe. The bombing also helped to divert the Luftwaffe from providing air cover for the German Army in Normandy in June 1944. The lack of a German air presence in France enabled the Allied Air Forces to exert a much greater degree of influence on the ground campaign.[24] In 1939, German AAA defences consisted of 7,873 artillery pieces. By 1944 this had risen to 39,253 by August 1944, a fivefold increase. Artillery production increased from 14,575 to 58,745 between 1941 and 1943. Heavy calibre gun production increased from 2,362 in 1939 to 13,260 in 1944.[25] This material could have been used to produce 40,000 fighters, which were three times more effective in shooting down bombers. Some 50,000 shells were required to shoot down one bomber.[26] Most importantly, of the 19,713 potent 88 mm and 128 mm artillery produced between 1942 and 1944, only 3,172 were sent to the frontlines for the German Army. The bombing campaign had encouraged their allocation to the Luftwaffe which denied the Army a critical resource for the ground battle.[27] Other research suggests the loss of 50 percent of electro-technical equipment and 33 percent of the optical industry, which was diverted from Army communications and units to signals equipment for AAA installations.[23]


References

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Citations

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  1. ^ a b Caldwell & Muller 2007, p. 189.
  2. ^ a b c d Caldwell & Muller 2007, p. 188.
  3. ^ Cox and Grey 2002, p. 103.
  4. ^ Cox & Gray 2002, p. 104.
  5. ^ Murray 1983, p. 277.
  6. ^ a b Weal 1996, p. 73.
  7. ^ Murray 1983, p. 283
  8. ^ Weal 1996, p. 75.
  9. ^ Hastings 1979, p. 272.
  10. ^ Frankland and Webster 2006, p. 10.
  11. ^ Hastings 1979, p. 274.
  12. ^ Hastings 1979, p. 289.
  13. ^ Cox and Grey 2002, p. 103.
  14. ^ Murray 1983, p. 283
  15. ^ Weal 1996, p. 75.
  16. ^ a b Buckley 1998, p. 165.
  17. ^ Murray 1983, p. 253.
  18. ^ Cite error: The named reference MacIsaac 1976, p. 9 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  19. ^ MacIsaac 1976, p. 6.
  20. ^ Hooton 1997, pp. 262-263.
  21. ^ Frankland and Webster (Vol 3), p. 268.
  22. ^ Buckley 1998, p. 166.
  23. ^ a b Overy 1980, p. 123.
  24. ^ Buckley 1998, p. 167.
  25. ^ Boog 2001, p. 227.
  26. ^ Boog 2001, p. 227.
  27. ^ Biddle 2002, p. 285.

Bibliography

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  • Buckley, John (1998). Air Power in the Age of Total War. UCL Press. ISBN 1-85728-589-1.
  • Caldwell, Donald L. (1994). JG 26 Photographic History of the Luftwaffe's Top Gun. Motorbooks International Publishers & Wholesalers. ISBN 0-87938-845-5.
  • Caldwell, Donald (2007). The Luftwaffe Over Germany: Defense of the Reich. Greenhill books. ISBN 978-1-85367-712-0. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Cooper, Mathew (1981). The German Air Force 1933-1945: An Anatomy of Failure. New York: Jane's Publishing Incorporated. ISBN 0-531-03733 9
  • Cox and Gray, Sebastian and Peter (2002). Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo. Frank Cass. ISBN 0 7146 8257 8
  • Dahl, Walther (2000). Rammjäger: Bericht über seine Kriegserlebnisse 1943 bis 1945 (in German). Pour le Mérite. ISBN 3-932381-01-7.
  • Gerbig, Werner (2004). Six Months to Oblivion: Defeat of the Luftwaffe Fighter Force Over the Western Front, 1944/45. Schiffer Publishing Ltd. ISBN 978-0-88740-348-4
  • Hall, Cargill (1998). Case Studies In Strategic Bombardment. Air Force History and Museums Program. ISBN 0-16-049781-7
  • Hastings, Max (1979). RAF Bomber Command. Pan Books. ISBN 0-330-39204-2
  • Hess, William (1994). B-17 Flying Fortress: Combat and Development History of the Flying Fortress. Motorbooks international. ISBN 0-87938-881-1
  • Manrho, John & Putz, Ron (2004). Bodenplatte: The Luftwaffe's Last Hope–The Attack on Allied Airfields, New Year's Day 1945. Hikoki Publications. ISBN 1-902109-40-6
  • Murray, Williamson (1983). Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933–1945. United States Government Printing. ISBN 978-9997393487
  • National Archives. (2000) The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, 1933-1945. ISBN 978-1-905615-30-8
  • Overy, Richard (1980). The Air War, 1939-1945. Potomac Books, Washington. ISBN 978-1-57488-716-7
  • Overy, Richard (1995). Why the Allies Won. Norton, New York. ISBN 0-393-31619-3 Parameter error in {{ISBN}}: checksum
  • Price, Alfred (1993). The Last Year of the Luftwaffe: May 1944 to May 1945. Greenhill Books, London. ISBN 1-85367-440-0
  • Thomas, Andrew (2005). Mosquito Aces of World War Two. Osprey, London. ISBN 978-1-84176-878-6
  • Weal, John (1996). Focke-Wulf Fw 190 Aces of the Western Front. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1-85532-595-0.
  • Weal, John (2006). Bf109 Defence of the Reich Aces. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 1-84176-879-0
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