War of the Spanish Succession

The War of the Spanish Succession was a European great power conflict fought between 1701 and 1714. The immediate cause was the death of the childless Charles II of Spain in November 1700, which led to a struggle for control of the Spanish Empire between supporters of the French Bourbons and the Habsburgs. Charles named his heir as Philip of Anjou, a grandson of Louis XIV of France, whose claim was backed by France and most of Spain. His rival, Archduke Charles of Austria, was supported by the Grand Alliance, whose primary members included Austria, the Dutch Republic, and Great Britain. Significant related conflicts include the 1700 to 1721 Great Northern War, and Queen Anne's War.

War of the Spanish Succession
Part of French–Habsburg rivalry; Anglo-French Wars

Clockwise, from top left:
DateMarch 1701–September 7, 1714 (13 years)
Location
Result Treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt, and Baden
Territorial
changes
Belligerents
Pro-Bourbon Spain Pro-Habsburg Spain
Commanders and leaders
Strength
Casualties and losses
  • : 400,000–500,000 killed and wounded
  • : c. 100,000 killed and wounded[12]
  • : 250,000 killed and wounded
  • : 200,000 killed and wounded[g]
  • : 50,000 killed and wounded
  • : 50,000 killed and wounded[12]
  • Total deaths in combat (both sides): 400,000[12]
  • Total including disease: 700,000[13] to 1,251,000[14]

Although by 1701 Spain was no longer the predominant European power, its global empire still included the Spanish Netherlands, large parts of Italy, and the Americas. Its acquisition by either France or Austria threatened the European balance of power, and Philip's proclamation as king of Spain on 16 November 1700 led to war. The French held the advantage in the early stages but were forced onto the defensive after 1706. Although the Allies continued to advance in northern France, by 1709 Philip had cemented his position in Spain, the ostensible cause of the war.

When Emperor Joseph I died in 1711, Archduke Charles succeeded his brother as Holy Roman Emperor. Since a union of Spain and Austria was as unwelcome as one with France, the new British government argued it was pointless to continue. By now, only British subsidies kept their allies in the war, and their withdrawal led to the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, followed by the treaties of Rastatt and Baden in 1714.

Philip was confirmed as king of Spain but renounced his claim and those of his descendants to the French throne. The Spanish Empire ceded much of its Italian territories to Savoy and Austria, along with the Spanish Netherlands, although it remained largely intact outside Europe. Britain received Gibraltar and Menorca and acquired major trade concessions in the Spanish Americas. For the Dutch, despite attaining their long sought-after Barrier Treaty, the war is seen as marking the beginning of their decline as a significant European power. Although Louis succeeded in placing his grandson on the Spanish throne, France was left financially exhausted.

Background

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Charles II of Spain succeeded his father Philip IV at the age of four in 1665. Subject to extended periods of ill-health for much of his life, the issue of his successor was a matter of diplomatic debate for decades. For example, in 1670 Charles II of England agreed to support the rights of Louis XIV of France, while the 1689 Grand Alliance committed England and the Dutch Republic to back those of Leopold I, Holy Roman Emperor.[15]

When Charles died in 1700, the Spanish Empire was no longer the dominant great power, but still included much of Italy and the Americas, the Spanish Netherlands, and colonies such as the Philippines.[16] Negotiations between Louis and Emperor Leopold centred on dividing these territories, which the Spanish refused to allow. Since the acquisition of an undivided empire by either Austria or France would make them too powerful, its inheritance led to a war that involved most of Europe. The 1700–1721 Great Northern War is considered a connected conflict since it affected the involvement of states such as Sweden, Saxony, Denmark–Norway and Russia.[17]

Armies in the 1688 to 1697 Nine Years' War frequently numbered over 100,000, requiring expenditure unsustainable for pre-industrial economies.[18] The 1690s also marked the low point of the Little Ice Age, a period of cold and wet weather that drastically reduced crop yields across Europe.[19] The Great Famine of 1695–1697 killed an estimated 15–25% of the population in present-day Scotland, Scandinavia and the Baltic states, plus another two million in France and Northern Italy.[20]

This combination of financial exhaustion and famine led to the October 1697 Treaty of Ryswick, a compromise that left the succession unresolved. Since it now seemed clear Charles would die without children, Leopold signed only with extreme reluctance, and all sides viewed Ryswick as only a temporary suspension of hostilities.[21]

Partition treaties

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Charles II, 1665–1700, last Habsburg King of Spain

Unlike the crowns of France or Austria, that of Spain could be inherited through the female line. This allowed Charles' sisters Maria Theresa (1638–1683) and Margaret Theresa (1651–1673) to pass their rights onto the children of their respective marriages with Louis XIV and Emperor Leopold. Louis sought to avoid conflict over the issue through direct negotiation with his main opponent William III of England while excluding the Spanish.[22]

Leopold and Margaret's daughter Maria Antonia (1669–1692) married Maximilian II Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria in 1685, and on 28 October 1692, they had a son, Joseph Ferdinand. Under the October 1698 Treaty of the Hague between France, Britain and the Dutch Republic, five-year-old Joseph was designated heir to Charles II; in return, France and Austria would receive parts of Spain's European territories.[23] Charles refused to accept this; on 14 November 1698, he published a will leaving an undivided Spanish monarchy to Joseph Ferdinand. However, the latter's death from smallpox in February 1699 undid these arrangements.[24]

In 1685, Maria Antonia passed her claim to the Spanish throne onto Leopold's sons, Joseph and Archduke Charles.[25] Her right to do so was doubtful, but Louis and William used this to devise the 1700 Treaty of London. Archduke Charles became the new heir, while France, Savoy and Austria received territorial compensation; however, since neither Leopold nor Charles agreed, the treaty was largely pointless.[26] By early October 1700, Charles was dying; his final will left the throne to Louis XIV's grandson Philip, Duke of Anjou; if he refused, the offer would pass to his younger brother the Duke of Berry, followed by Archduke Charles.[27]

Charles died on 1 November 1700, and on the 9th, Spanish ambassadors formally offered the throne to Philip. Louis briefly considered refusing; although it meant the succession of Archduke Charles, insisting William help him enforce the Treaty of London meant he might achieve his territorial aims without fighting. However, his son the Dauphin rejected the idea; French diplomats also advised Austria would fight regardless, while neither the British nor Dutch would go to war for a settlement intended to avoid war. Louis therefore accepted on behalf of his grandson, who was proclaimed Philip V of Spain on 16 November 1700.[27]

Prelude to war

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Proclamation of Philip of Anjou as Philip V of Spain, Versailles, 16 November 1700

With most of his objectives achieved by diplomacy, Louis now made a series of moves that combined to make war inevitable.[28] The Tory majority in the English Parliament objected to the Partition Treaties, chiefly the French acquisition of Sicily, an important link in the lucrative Levant trade.[29] However, a foreign diplomat observed their refusal to become involved in a European war was true "only so long as English commerce does not suffer".[30] Louis either failed to appreciate this or decided to ignore it and his actions gradually eroded Tory opposition.[31]

In early 1701, Louis registered Philip's claim to the French throne with the Parlement of Paris, raising the possibility of union with Spain, contrary to Charles' will, though Philip was only third in the French succession. In February, the Spanish-controlled Duchy of Milan and allied Duchy of Mantua in Northern Italy announced their support for Philip and accepted French troops. Combined with efforts to build an alliance between France and Imperial German states in Swabia and Franconia, these were challenges Leopold could not ignore.[32]

Helped by the governor, Max Emanuel of Bavaria, French troops replaced Dutch garrisons in the 'Barrier' fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands, granted at Ryswick. It also threatened the Dutch monopoly over the Scheldt granted by the 1648 Peace of Münster, while French control of Antwerp and Ostend would allow them to blockade the English Channel at will.[33] Combined with other French actions that threatened English trade, this produced a clear majority for war and in May 1701, Parliament urged William to negotiate an anti-French alliance.[34]

On 7 September, Leopold, the Dutch Republic and Britain[h] signed the Treaty of The Hague renewing the 1689 Grand Alliance. Its provisions included securing the Dutch Barrier in the Spanish Netherlands, the Protestant succession in England and Scotland and an independent Spain but did not refer to placing Archduke Charles on the Spanish throne.[35] When the exiled James II of England died on 16 September 1701, Louis reneged on his recognition of the Protestant William III as king of England and Scotland and supported the claim of James' son, James Francis Edward Stuart. War became inevitable and when William himself died in March 1702, his successor Queen Anne confirmed her support for the Treaty of the Hague.[36] The Dutch now led by Grand Pensionary Anthonie Heinsius did the same, despite French hopes that without a Stadtholder the republic would be torn apart internally.[37] On 8 May the Dutch Republic declared war on France, followed by the British and the Emperor on 15 May and the Imperial Diet on 30 September.[36]

General strategic drivers

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France's central position required the Grand Alliance to attack on exterior lines.

The importance of trade and economic interests to the participants is often underestimated; contemporaries viewed Dutch and English support for the Habsburg cause as primarily driven by a desire for access to Spanish markets in the Americas.[38] While modern economists generally assume a constantly growing market, the then dominant theory of mercantilism viewed it as relatively static. This meant increasing your own share of a market required taking it from someone else, with the state facilitating this by attacking opponents' merchant ships and colonies.[39]

As a result, the war quickly expanded to North America, India, and other parts of Asia, with tariffs used as a policy weapon. The 1651–1663 Navigation Acts were a major factor in the Anglo-Dutch Wars, while between 1690 and 1704, English import duties on foreign goods increased by 400%. On 6 September 1700, France banned the import of English manufactured goods such as cloth and imposed prohibitive duties on a wide range of others.[40]

The field armies that operated in the Southern Netherlands during the Nine Years' War had often reached 100,000 men. The size of armies continued to grow during the War of the Spanish Succession. Between 1702 and 1707, the field armies in the Southern Netherlands had a strength of 60,000 to 80,000 men, and from 1708 onwards, over 120,000 men.[41] These extensive armies placed immense strain on pre-industrial economies.[41][42] Armies were restricted by their dependence on water-borne transport for supplies, so campaigns focused on rivers like the Rhine and Adda, while their absence limited operations in areas like Northern Spain. Better logistics, unified command, and simpler internal lines of communication gave Bourbon armies an advantage over their opponents.[43]

Strategic objectives by participant

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Spain

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An Anglo-Dutch squadron captures a Spanish treasure fleet, Vigo Bay, October 1702

In 1700, Spain remained a great power in terms of territory control; recent research moreover shows that imports of bullion from the Americas reached their highest level between 1670 and 1700.[44] However, this concealed major structural weaknesses; the vast majority of these imports were used to fund debt or pay foreign merchants. When the new Bourbon administration took over in 1701, they found the empire bankrupt and effectively defenceless, with fewer than 15,000 troops in Spain itself and a navy consisting of 20 ships in total.[45]

Almost constant warfare during the 17th century made the economy subject to long periods of low productivity and depression, and largely reliant upon others for its prosperity. In many ways, the continued existence of the empire was not due to Spanish strength but to maintain a balance between the powers competing for a share of its markets. Despite fighting a series of wars against Spain from 1667 to 1697, France was also its most significant economic partner, supplying labour and controlling a large proportion of its foreign trade. This consideration was an important factor in the decision to name Philip his heir.[44] Its dependence on others was illustrated in 1703; despite the presence of an invading Allied army, the French ambassador urged Louis to allow Dutch and English merchants to purchase wool from Spanish farmers, "otherwise the flocks cannot be maintained".[45]

Enacting political or economic reform was extremely complex since Habsburg Spain was a personal union between the Crowns of Castile and Aragon, each with very different political cultures.[i] Most of Philip's support came from the Castilian elite.[46] The Spanish Netherlands had been governed by prince-elector Max Emanuel of Bavaria since 1692, while links with Italy, traditionally the major source of Spanish recruits and funding, had been weakened by decades of neglect and heavy taxation. It was widely, if reluctantly, accepted in Madrid that preserving an independent Spanish Empire required comprehensive reforms, including the elimination of the privileges or Fueros held by the Aragonese states. It was no coincidence Archduke Charles had strong support in areas that were part of the Crown of Aragon, including Catalonia and Valencia.[47]

France

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Under Louis XIV, France was the most powerful state in Europe, with revenue-generating capacities that far exceeded those of its rivals. Its geographical position provided enormous tactical flexibility; unlike Austria, it had a navy, and as the campaigns of 1708–1710 proved, even under severe pressure it could defend its borders. The Nine Years' War had shown France could not impose its objectives without support, and its new alliance with Spain and Bavaria made a successful outcome more likely.[citation needed] However, the previous wars had left France with severe economic problems. This was recognized by the Marquis de Chamlay, who advised Louis to not take on a purely offensive strategy. He argued that the combined might of the Grand Alliance forces made it highly improbable for France to launch a successful attack. The Dutch and Imperial fortresses were located far from convenient Franco-Spanish bases, and the Netherlands and Rhineland lacked easily navigable rivers for the Bourbon armies. Furthermore, besieging a major Dutch fortress demanded the commitment of two full armies. The French would thus pursue a strategy described as a "mixed war" in Europe. In this strategy, the Franco-Spanish forces would primarily assume a defensive posture to safeguard the vital fortresses they needed to retain. Offensive actions, on the other hand, were characterized by assertive posturing and strategic positioning, with an emphasis on sustaining their forces by living off enemy territory whenever feasible, while blocking enemy thrusts, and trying to engage them in battle where possible.[48] Apart from denying an undivided Spanish monarchy to others, Louis's objectives were to secure his borders with the Holy Roman Empire, weaken his rival Austria, and increase French commercial strength through access to trade with the Americas.[citation needed]

Austria and the Holy Roman Empire

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Francis Rákóczi, leader of the 1703–1711 Hungarian revolt; funded by France, this was a major distraction for Austria

Despite being the dominant power within the Holy Roman Empire, Austrian and Imperial interests did not always coincide. The Habsburgs wanted to put Archduke Charles on the throne of an undivided Spanish monarchy, while their Allies were fighting to prevent either the Bourbons or the Habsburgs from doing so. This divergence and Austria's financial collapse in 1703 meant the campaign in Spain was reliant on Anglo-Dutch naval support and after 1706, British funding. Particularly during the reign of Joseph I, the priority for the Habsburgs was to secure their southern borders from French intervention in northern Italy and suppress Rákóczi's War of Independence in Hungary.[49]

Much of the Spanish nobility resented what they considered to be the arrogance of the Austrians, a key factor in the selection of Philip as their preferred candidate in 1700. In return for British support, Charles agreed to major commercial concessions within the empire, as well as accepting British control of Gibraltar and Menorca. These made him widely unpopular at all levels of Spanish society, and he was never able to sustain himself outside the coastal regions, which could be supplied by the Anglo-Dutch navies.[50]

The Wittelsbach-controlled states of Bavaria, Liège, and Cologne allied with France, but the vast majority of the Empire remained neutral, or limited their involvement to the supply of mercenaries.[citation needed] Like Bavaria, the larger entities pursued their own policies; his claim to the Polish crown meant Augustus of Saxony focused on the Great Northern War, while Frederick I made his support dependent on Leopold recognising Prussia as a kingdom and making it an equal member of the Grand Alliance. Since George, Elector of Hanover, was also heir to the British throne, his support was more reliable, but the suspicion remained that the interests of Hanover came first.[51]

England and Scotland/Great Britain

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Participants in the War of the Spanish Succession in 1703: Pro-Habsburg (orange) and Pro-Bourbon (lavender)

British foreign policy was based on three general principles, which remained largely consistent from the 16th through the 20th centuries. The first, overriding all others, was to preserve a balance of power in Europe, an objective threatened by French expansion under Louis XIV. The second was to prevent the Low Countries from being controlled by a hostile power or one stronger than Britain; this included both the Spanish Netherlands and the Dutch Republic, whose deep harbours and prevailing winds made her a natural embarkation point for an attack on England, as demonstrated in 1688. The third was to maintain a navy strong enough to protect British trade, control her waters and launch attacks on her enemies' commercial routes and coastal areas.[52]

Alignment on reducing the power of France and securing the Protestant succession for the British throne masked differences on how to achieve them. In general, the Tories favoured a mercantilist strategy of using the Royal Navy to attack French and Spanish trade while protecting and expanding their own; land commitments were viewed as expensive and primarily of benefit to others.[53] The Whigs argued France could not be defeated by seapower alone, making a Continental strategy essential, while Britain's financial strength made it the only member of the Alliance able to operate on all fronts against France.[54]

Dutch Republic

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The Dutch had been engaged in the struggle to contain France since the Rampjaar (Disaster Year) of 1672, when the Dutch Republic had nearly been overrun by the French army. Apart from the worry about the balance of power, the Dutch had long been concerned with the fate of the Spanish Netherlands, viewing it as a strategic buffer against France. This perception endured even during periods of alliance with France, as evidenced by the popularity of the motto "Gallicus amicus non vicinus" (France is a good friend, not a good neighbour) within the Dutch Republic.[55] The War of Devolution (1667–68) and the Franco-Dutch War (1672–78) showed the Spanish could not defend the Southern Netherlands, and so the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick allowed the Dutch to place garrisons in eight key cities. They hoped this barrier would provide the strategic depth needed to protect their commercial and demographic heartlands around Amsterdam against attack from the south. However, with the help of Maximilian of Bavaria, the governor of the Spanish Netherlands, the Dutch garrison troops had been replaced by French troops by 1701. Dutch priorities were to re-establish and strengthen the Barrier fortresses, retain control of the economically vital Scheldt estuary, and gain access to trade in the Spanish Empire.[56]

Although the English Duke of Marlborough was Allied commander in the Low Countries, the Dutch provided most of the manpower and supplies. Strategy in this theatre was thus subject to the approval of their field deputies and generals.[j] When Dutch forces operated outside the Spanish Netherlands this was often a concession to their English allies.[56][58]

Savoy

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Victor Amadeus II, Duke of Savoy

Throughout the 17th century, Savoy sought to replace Spain as the dominant power in Northern Italy. Savoy consisted of two main geographic segments; Piedmont, which contained the capital Turin, and the Duchy of Aosta on the Italian side of the Alps, with the Duchy of Savoy and County of Nice in Transalpine France. The latter were almost impossible to defend and combined with the anti-Habsburg policy pursued by Louis XIV and his predecessors, this meant Savoy generally sided with France. However, Piedmont provided foreign powers access to the restive southern French provinces of the Dauphiné and Vaunage, former Huguenot strongholds with a long history of rebellion. This provided Victor Amadeus II with a degree of leverage, allowing him to manoeuvre between opposing parties to expand his territories.[59]

During the Nine Years' War in 1690, Savoy joined the Grand Alliance before agreeing to a separate peace with France in 1696. The accession of Philip V in 1701 led to a reversal of long-standing strategic policy, with France now supporting the Spanish position in Lombardy, rather than seeking to weaken it, and Austria doing the opposite. While Victor Amadeus initially allied Savoy with France, his long-term goal was the acquisition of the Duchy of Milan, which neither Bourbons nor Habsburgs would relinquish voluntarily. As discussed elsewhere in this article, securing his borders in Italy was of greater concern to Emperor Leopold than Spain itself. This meant Britain was the only power inclined to help Victor Amadeus achieve this objective and he changed sides in 1703 after the Anglo-Dutch navies won control of the Western Mediterranean.[60]

Military campaigns; 1701–1708

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Italy

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Northern Italy; Milan, Savoy, and Mantua were the primary areas of conflict

The war in Italy primarily involved the Spanish-ruled Duchy of Milan and the French-allied Duchy of Mantua, considered essential to the security of Austria's southern borders. In 1701, French troops occupied both cities and Victor Amadeus II, Duke of Savoy, allied with France, his daughter Maria Luisa marrying Philip V.[61] In May 1701, an Imperial army under Prince Eugene of Savoy moved into Northern Italy; by February 1702, victories at Carpi, Chiari, and Cremona forced the French behind the Adda River.[62]

Louis Joseph, Duke of Vendôme, one of the best French generals, took command and was substantially reinforced; Prince Eugene managed a draw at the Battle of Luzzara but the French recovered most of the territory and lost the year before.[63] In October 1703, Victor Amadeus declared war on France; by May 1706, the French held most of Savoy except Turin while victories at Cassano and Calcinato forced the Imperialists into the Trentino valley.[64]

However, in July 1706, Vendôme and any available forces were sent to reinforce France's northern frontier after the defeat at Ramillies. Reinforced by German auxiliaries led by Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, Prince Eugene broke the siege of Turin in September; despite a minor French victory at Castiglione, the war in Italy was over. To the fury of his allies, the 1707 Convention of Milan Emperor Joseph gave French troops in Lombardy free passage to Southern France.[65]

A combined Savoyard-Imperial attack on the French base of Toulon planned for April was postponed when Imperial troops were diverted to seize the Spanish Bourbon Kingdom of Naples. By the time they besieged Toulon in August, the French were too strong, and they were forced to withdraw. By the end of 1707, fighting in Italy ceased, apart from small-scale attempts by Victor Amadeus to recover Nice and Savoy.[66]

Low Countries, Rhine, and Danube

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Low Countries; note the location of Prince-Bishopric of Liège (in pink). Red lines show the pré carré, a double line of fortresses guarding the French border.

The first objective for the Grand Alliance in this theatre was to secure the Dutch frontiers, threatened by the alliance between France, Bavaria, and Joseph Clemens of Bavaria, ruler of Liège and Cologne. During 1702, the Grand Alliance repelled an assault on Nijmegen, captured Kaiserswerth, a strong town on the eastern side of the Dutch Republic, and took Venlo, Roermond, Stevensweert and Liège along the Meuse.[67] The 1703 campaign was marred by Allied conflicts over strategy. Despite capturing Bonn, they failed to take Antwerp, while a Dutch contingent narrowly escaped disaster at Ekeren in June.[68]

On the Upper Rhine, Imperial forces under Louis William, Margrave of Baden-Baden remained on the defensive, although they took Landau in 1702. Supported by the Bavarians, during the 1703 campaign French forces retook Landau, won victories at Friedlingen, Höchstädt and Speyerbach, then captured Kehl and Breisach. With Austrian resources absorbed by Rákóczi's War of Independence in Hungary, the Franco-Bavarian plan for 1704 was to march on Vienna.[69] To relieve the pressure, Marlborough marched up the Rhine, joined forces with Louis of Baden and Prince Eugene, and crossed the Danube on 2 July. Allied victory at Blenheim on 13 August forced Bavaria out of the war and the Treaty of Ilbersheim placed it under Austrian rule.[70]

Allied efforts to exploit their victory in 1705 floundered on poor coordination, tactical disputes, and command rivalries.[71] A diplomatic crisis between the Dutch Republic and England was only averted by the dismissal of General Slangenburg,[72] while the imposition of Austrian rule in Bavaria caused a brief but vicious peasant revolt.[71] In May 1706, the French were comprehensively defeated at Ramillies by an Allied army under Marlborough, which then occupied much of the Spanish Netherlands in under two weeks.[73] France assumed a largely defensive posture for the rest of the war.[74]

The 1707 campaign was without any significant events, as both parties focussed on other fronts. The French, now under Marshal Vendôme, avoided battle and Marlborough did little to force one upon them. By 1708, the focus of both sides was again almost entirely on the fighting in the Low Countries. The allies once more set their sights on breaking French fortification belts, while the French themselves planned a major counteroffensive. Although this counteroffensive was initially successful when the French surprised the Allied garrisons at Ghent and Bruges,[k] it failed after the Allies defeated them at the Battle of Oudenaarde. In its aftermath the Allies managed to capture Lille, the strongest fortress of the French fortress belts, while a French assault on Brussels was reppelled and Ghent and Bruges recaptured.[76][75] But despite losses like Lille and other strongpoints, the French would prevent the Allies from making a decisive breach in their frontiers.[74]

Spain and Portugal

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Peninsular Spain, showing Castile and Aragon

British involvement was primarily driven by the need to protect their trade routes in the Mediterranean. By putting Archduke Charles on the Spanish throne, they also hoped to gain commercial privileges within the Spanish Empire. Despite their dynastic claim, the Austrian Habsburgs viewed securing Northern Italy and suppressing the Hungarian revolt as higher priorities. With the Dutch focusing on Flanders post-1704, this theatre was largely dependent on British naval and military support.[77]

Spain at the time was a personal union between the Crowns of Castile and Aragon. The latter was further divided into the separate entities of Catalonia, Aragon, Valencia, Majorca, Sicily, Naples, and Sardinia. In 1701, Majorca, Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia declared for Philip, while a mixture of anti-Castilian and anti-French sentiment meant the others supported Archduke Charles, the most important being Catalonia. Allied victory at Vigo Bay in October 1702 persuaded Peter II of Portugal to switch sides, giving them an operational base in this area.[78]

Archduke Charles landed at Lisbon in March 1704 to begin a land campaign, while the British-Dutch capture of Gibraltar was a significant blow to Bourbon prestige. An attempt to retake it was defeated in August, with a land siege being abandoned in April 1705.[79] The 1705 Pact of Genoa between Catalan representatives and Britain opened a second front in the north-east; the loss of Barcelona and Valencia left Toulon as the only major port available to the Bourbons in the Western Mediterranean. Philip tried to retake Barcelona in May 1706 but was repulsed, while his absence allowed an Allied force from Portugal to enter Madrid and Zaragoza.[80]

However, lack of popular support and logistical issues meant the Allies could not hold territory away from the coastline, and by November, Philip controlled Castile, Murcia, and parts of Valencia. Allied efforts to regain the initiative ended with defeat at Almansa in April 1707, followed by an unsuccessful siege of Toulon in August. Despite these failures, control of Gibraltar and the capture of Menorca in 1708 allowed the Royal Navy to dominate the Western Mediterranean. Since many British politicians considered this their primary objective, they became reluctant to approve further expensive land campaigns in this theatre.[77]

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The West Indies; the huge profits associated with sugar production made this area highly significant.

The close links between war and trade meant conflict extended beyond Europe, particularly in North America, where it is known as Queen Anne's War, and the West Indies, which produced sugar, then a hugely profitable commodity. Also, there were minor trade conflicts in South America, India, and Asia; the financial strains of war particularly affected the Dutch East India Company, as it was a huge drain on scarce naval resources.

Related conflicts include Rákóczi's War of Independence in Hungary, which was funded by France and a serious concern for the Habsburgs throughout the war. In South-Eastern France, Britain funded the Huguenot 1704-1710 Camisard rebellion; one objective of the 1707 campaign in Northern Italy and Southern France was to support this revolt, one of a series that began in the 1620s.

Towards peace; 1709–1715

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By the end of 1708, the French had withdrawn from Northern Italy, while the maritime powers controlled the Spanish Netherlands, and secured the borders of the Dutch Republic; in the Mediterranean, the maritime powers had achieved naval supremacy, and Britain acquired permanent bases in Gibraltar and Menorca. However, as Marlborough himself pointed out, the French frontiers remained largely intact, their army showed no signs of being defeated, while Philip proved far more popular with the Spanish than his rival. Many of the objectives set out by the Grand Alliance in 1701 had been achieved, but success in 1708 made them overconfident.[81]

Diplomacy and renewed war

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French diplomats focused on the Dutch, whom they considered were more likely to favour peace than their allies, for victory at Ramillies removed any direct military threat to the Republic, while highlighting differences with Britain on the Spanish Netherlands. Peace talks broke down in late 1708 because the Allies had agreed not to negotiate a separate peace but could not agree on the terms.[82] The Great Frost of 1709 caused widespread famine in France and Spain, forcing Louis to re-open negotiations and he hinted at his willingness to cede French fortresses to the Dutch Republic.[83][84]

In May 1709 the Allies presented him with the preliminaries of the Hague. Britain and Austria still insisted on an undivided Spanish monarchy for Archduke Charles. The Allies demanded that Philip was given two months to cede his throne to Charles, while France was required to remove him by force if he did not comply, besides having to cede the strongholds, Thionville, Cambrai and Valenciennes as collateral.[83] Although Spain was of less importance to them, the Dutch negotiators, led by Heinsius, considered these strict conditions necessary to ensure that peace conditions were honoured, as they doubted Louis' sincerity. They were concerned that the Allies would still have to exhaust themselves in Spain, while France, after a period of recuperation, might once again lend support to Phillip.[85]

 
Battle of Malplaquet, 1709: an Allied victory, the losses shocked Europe and increased the desire for peace.

Many Allied statesmen, including Marlborough, assumed Philip would abdicate on request and felt that the terms seriously underestimated France's ability to continue the war. They also required the Spanish to accept Archduke Charles as king in his place, which they were certainly unwilling to do, as demonstrated by the failure of Allied campaigns to hold territory outside Catalonia.[86] Although Louis seemed willing to abandon his ambitions in Spain, making war on his grandson was unacceptable, a stipulation so offensive that when made public, the French resolved to fight on.[87]

Following success in the Siege of Tournai, Marlborough's 1709 offensive in northern France culminated in the Battle of Malplaquet on 11 September; a nominal Allied victory, but one in which their total casualties numbered 22,000 out of 86,000 soldiers, the Dutch infantry losing 8,500 out of 18,000.[88] Although the French strategic position continued to deteriorate, the battle showed that their fighting abilities had remained intact and increased war-weariness in both Britain and the Dutch Republic. More significant were Franco-Spanish victories at Alicante in April, and La Gudina in May, which showed that a successful military solution in Spain for the Allies now appeared remote.[89]

Shortly after, the Dutch discovered they had been excluded from a commercial agreement signed by Archduke Charles which granted Britain exclusive trading rights in Spanish America. This deepened divisions between the Allies while increasing Spanish opposition to having the Archduke as their king.[89] The Whig government in London was however afraid to push the Dutch into the hands of the French and went back on their commercial agreement with Archduke Charles. In exchange for a Dutch guarantee to support the Hanoverian succession, Britain agreed to share trading rights in Spanish America and the Mediterranean. Additionally, the Whigs promised the Dutch a significantly expanded barrier in the Spanish Netherlands, including key fortress towns such as Lille, Valenciennes, Condé and Maubeuge. The Dutch now seemed to obtain all they had ever wanted outset of the war, not only in the Low Countries but also in the Mediterranean and America.[90] It however proved to be an awkward and ill-fated agreement. The treaty quickly sparked resentment, particularly from the Emperor, who was offended by the heavy burden it imposed on Charles's sovereignty over the Southern Netherlands, while in Britain the new treaty led to heavy opposition by the Tories as they saw it as detrimental to British commerce.[91][89]

The Whigs had won the 1708 British general election by arguing military victory was the quickest road to peace, but failure in France was mirrored in Spain. Archduke Charles re-entered Madrid in 1710 after victories at Almenar and Saragossa, but the Allies could not hold the interior and were forced to retreat. 3,500 British troops surrendered at Brihuega on 8 December, while the Battle of Villaviciosa on 10 December confirmed Bourbon control of Spain.[92] At the same time, costs continued to spiral; the Dutch were close to bankruptcy while Austrian troops were almost entirely funded by Britain. In 1709, Parliament approved expenditures of £6.4 million, up from £5.0 million in 1706; by the end of 1710, these had doubled to £12.9 million, despite minimal gains.[93]

Negotiations

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Battle of Denain, July 1712; defeat ended Austrian and Dutch hopes of improving their negotiating position.

When talks resumed at Geertruidenberg in March 1710, Louis now even showed a willingness to assist the Allies in removing his grandson from Spain. The Dutch proposed compensating Philip with Sicily and Sardinia, but neither the Austrians or British would agree, and negotiations broke down again.[94] However, it was clear to the French the mood in Britain had changed. This was confirmed when the pro-peace Tories won a landslide victory in the October 1710 British election, although they confirmed their commitment to the war to prevent a credit crisis. Despite the capture of Bouchain in September, a decisive victory in northern France continued to elude the Allies, while an attack on Quebec ended in disaster.[95]

When Emperor Joseph died in April 1711, his brother Archduke Charles was elected emperor. For the Dutch and British, his accession undermined a key reason for continuing the war, since a union of Spain with Austria was as unwelcome as one with France. The British secretly negotiated peace terms directly with France, leading to the signing of the Preliminary Articles of London on 8 October 1711.[l] These included French acceptance of the Act of Settlement 1701 and a guarantee the French and Spanish crowns would remain separate. In addition, France undertook to ensure Spain ceded Gibraltar and Menorca, while giving Britain a thirty-year monopoly on the Asiento de Negros, the right to import slaves into Spanish American colonies.[96] Despite their resentment at being excluded from these talks, the Dutch were financially exhausted by the war, and could not continue without British support. Charles VI initially rejected the idea of a peace conference, only agreeing once the Dutch decided to support it, but continued to oppose the treaty.[97]

Peace of Utrecht

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The Treaty of Utrecht; Abraham Allard, 18th century

Within weeks of the conference opening, events threatened the basis of the peace agreed between Britain and France. First, the French presented proposals awarding the Spanish Netherlands to Max Emmanuel of Bavaria and a minimal Barrier, leaving the Dutch with little to show for their huge investment of money and men. Second, a series of deaths left Louis XIV's two-year-old great-grandson, the future Louis XV as heir, making Philip next in line and his immediate renunciation imperative.[98]

The Dutch and Austrians fought on, hoping to improve their negotiating position but the new British government ordered Marlborough's replacement, James Butler, 2nd Duke of Ormonde, not to participate in offensive operations against the French.[99] These orders caused fury then and later, with Whigs urging Hanoverian military intervention. Those considered responsible, including Ormonde and the Tory statesman Henry St John, 1st Viscount Bolingbroke, were driven into exile when George I succeeded Queen Anne in 1714, and became prominent Jacobites.[100]

Prince Eugene captured Le Quesnoy in June and besieged Landrecies, but was defeated at Denain on 24 July. The French then went on to recapture Le Quesnoy and other towns lost in previous two years, including Marchines, Douai, and Bouchain. This showed the French retained their fighting ability, while the Dutch had finally reached the end of their willingness and ability to continue the war.[101]

On 6 June, Philip confirmed his renunciation of the French throne, and the British offered the Dutch a revised Barrier Treaty, replacing that of 1709 which they rejected as overly generous. A significant improvement on the 1697 Barrier, it was subject to Austrian approval, and while less beneficial, the final terms were sufficient for the Dutch to agree.[102] Despite this, negotiations dragged on until 1715, as the Austrians were reluctant to pay for Dutch garrisons stationed in their territory, although British pressure meant the issue was ultimately concluded in favour of the Dutch.[103]

 
Western Europe in 1714, after the Treaties of Utrecht and Rastatt

Charles withdrew from the conference when France insisted he guarantee not to acquire Mantua or Mirandola. He was supported by the future George I, who wanted France to withdraw backing for the Stuart heir James Francis. As a result, neither Austria nor the Empire signed the Peace of Utrecht of 11 April 1713 between France and the other Allies; Spain made peace with the Dutch in June, then Savoy and Britain on 13 July 1713.[104]

Treaties of Rastatt and Baden

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Fighting continued on the Rhine, but Austria was financially exhausted and after the loss of Landau and Freiburg in November 1713, Charles finally made peace on 7 March 1714. In the Treaty of Rastatt, the Habsburg monarchy acceded to the terms of Utrecht, which confirmed their gains in Southern Italy, returned Breisach, Kehl, and Freiburg, ended French support for the Hungarian revolt and agreed on terms for the Dutch Barrier fortresses. Charles abandoned his claim to Strasbourg and Alsace and agreed to the restoration of the Wittelsbach electors of Bavaria and Cologne, Max Emmanuel and Joseph Clemens, lifting the Imperial ban on them. Article XIX of the treaty transferred sovereignty over the Spanish Netherlands to Austria. On 7 September, the Holy Roman Empire joined the agreement by the Treaty of Baden; although Catalonia and Majorca were not finally subdued by the Bourbons until June 1715, the war was over.[105]

Aftermath

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The Royal Navy destroys a Spanish fleet off Sicily, Cape Passaro, August 1718

Article II of the Peace of Utrecht included the stipulation "because of the great danger which threatened the liberty and safety of all Europe, from the too-close conjunction of the kingdoms of Spain and France, ... the same person should never become King of both kingdoms." Some historians view this as a key point in the evolution of the modern nation-state; Randall Lesaffer argues it marks a significant milestone in the concept of collective security.[106]

Spain

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Philip was confirmed as king of Spain, which retained its independence and the majority of its empire, in return for ceding the Spanish Netherlands, most of its Italian possessions, as well as Gibraltar and Menorca. These losses were deeply felt; Naples and Sicily were regained in 1735 and Menorca in 1782, although Gibraltar would still be held by Britain, despite numerous attempts to regain it. The 1707 Nueva Planta decrees centralised power in Madrid, and abolished regional political structures including the Crown of Aragon, although Catalonia and Majorca remained outside the system until 1767.[107] Their economy recovered remarkably quickly, and the House of Bourbon (save for brief interruptions) has held the Spanish throne ever since.[108]

France

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Louis XIV died on 1 September 1715, and was succeeded by his five-year-old great-grandson Louis XV; on his deathbed, he is alleged to have admitted, "I have loved war too well".[109] True or not, while the final settlement was far more favourable than the Allied terms of 1709, it is hard to see what Louis gained that he had not already achieved through diplomacy by February 1701.[110] From 1666 onward French policies assumed military and economic superiority over their rivals, but this was no longer the case by 1714 when Britain appeared to have overtaken France on both fronts. The continued widening of this gap as British trade expanded post-Utrecht was viewed by Louis's successors as a permanent threat to the European balance of power. Seeking to reduce this was a major factor in France entering the 1740–1748 War of the Austrian Succession.[111]

Austria and the Holy Roman Empire

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Despite the failure in Spain, Austria secured its position in Italy and Hungary and acquired the bulk of the Spanish Netherlands; even after reimbursing the Dutch for the cost of their Barrier garrisons, the increased revenues from the Austrian Netherlands funded a significant expansion of the Austrian army.[112] The Habsburgs also acquired the duchies of Milan and Mantua, the kingdoms of Naples and Sardinia (exchanged in 1720 for Sicily) and a dominance over Italy that would last (interrupted by Napoleon) until 1859. The shift of Habsburg focus away from Germany and into Southern Europe continued with victory in the Austro-Turkish War of 1716–1718. Their position as the dominant power within the Holy Roman Empire was challenged by Bavaria, Hanover, Prussia, and Saxony, who increasingly acted as independent powers; in 1742, Charles Albert of Bavaria became the first non-Habsburg Emperor in over 300 years.[113]

Great Britain

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Britain is usually seen as the main beneficiary of Utrecht, which marked its rise to becoming the dominant European commercial power.[114] It established naval superiority over its competitors, acquired the strategic Mediterranean ports of Gibraltar and Menorca and trading rights in Spanish America. France accepted the Protestant succession, ensuring a smooth inheritance by George I in August 1714, while agreeing to end support for the Stuarts in the 1716 Anglo-French Treaty.[115] Although the war left all participants with unprecedented levels of government debt, only Britain was able to finance it efficiently, providing a relative advantage over its competitors.[116]

Dutch Republic

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Veurne
 
Knokke
 
Ypres
 
Menen
 
Tournai
 
Mons
 
Dendermonde
 
Namur
The Barrier fortresses as agreed in 1715, corresponding to the modern borders of Belgium

The Dutch had successfully recovered their positions in the Southern Netherlands, and their troops were central to the alliance which halted French territorial expansion in Europe until a new cycle began in 1792.[76] However, the war left them effectively bankrupt, and inflicted permanent damage on the Dutch merchant navy; while they remained the dominant economic power in the Far East, Britain took over as the pre-eminent global commercial and maritime power.[117] The exhaustion of the Dutch admiralties had also allowed the pirates from Algiers to capture numerous Dutch merchant vessels, which the Dutch were only able to stop after a long conflict. The Barrier Treaty fortresses became the central driver of Dutch foreign policy in the decades after 1713 and were put to the test during the War of the Austrian Succession.[m]

Other

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Wider implications include the rise of Prussia and Savoy while many of the participants were involved in the 1700–1721 Great Northern War, with Russia becoming a major European power for the first time as a result. Finally, while colonial conflicts were relatively minor and largely confined to the North American theatre, the so-called Queen Anne's War, they were to become a key element in future wars.[110] Meanwhile, maritime unemployment brought on by the war's end led to the third stage of the Golden Age of Piracy, as many sailors formerly employed in the navies of the warring powers turned to piracy for survival.[123]

Claims to the Spanish throne

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Family tree of claimants to the Spanish throne following the death of Charles II
Philip III
King of Spain

1578–1621
Margaret
of Austria

1584–1611
Ferdinand III
Holy Roman Emperor

1608–1657
Maria Anna
of Spain

1606–1646
Anne
of Austria

1601–1666
Elisabeth
of France

1602–1644
Philip IV
King of Spain

1605–1665
Mariana
of Austria

1635–1696
Louis XIV
King of France

1638–1715
Maria Theresa
of Spain

1638–1683
Charles II
King of Spain

1661–1700
Margaret Theresa
of Spain

1651–1673
Leopold I
Holy Roman Emperor

1640–1705
Eleonore Magdalene
of Neuburg

1655–1720
Louis
Grand Dauphin of France

1661–1711
Maria Antonia
of Austria

1669–1692
Charles VI
Holy Roman Emperor

1685–1740
Louis
Petit Dauphin of France

1682–1712
Philip V
King of Spain

1683–1746
Charles
Duke of Berry

1686–1714
Joseph Ferdinand
of Bavaria

1692–1699
Notes
Potential heirs are shown with a golden border. In cases of second marriages, the earlier spouse is to the left and the later to the right.
References
  • Durant, W.; Durant, A. (2011). The Age of Louis XIV: The Story of Civilization. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 9781451647655.
  • Kamen, H. (2001). Philip V of Spain: The King Who Reigned Twice. New Haven: Yale University Press. ISBN 9780300180541.


See also

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Explanatory notes

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  1. ^ The Spanish Army consisted of three separate forces; Spain (20,000), Spanish Netherlands (35,000) and Italy (15,000). These are authorised numbers and actual were almost certainly lower.[3]
  2. ^ Annual average, 1701–1713. Wilson estimates Imperial strength peaked at 343,000 in 1710.[6]
  3. ^ Ostwald estimates Dutch strength peaked at 137,000.[8]
  4. ^ Including the Danish Auxiliary Corps
  5. ^ The majority of Prussian troops were hired out to the Dutch or served with Imperial forces in Northern Italy.
  6. ^ Although the Portuguese promised to provide 28,000 men, their effective strength in 1704 barely reached 15,000 men[11]
  7. ^ Split 50:50 between Habsburg monarchy and other HRE states.[12]
  8. ^ England and Scotland were separate kingdoms until 1707 but the Treaty was signed by William as King of Great Britain
  9. ^ Aragon was divided into the Kingdoms of Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, Majorca, Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia.
  10. ^ Athlone until 1703, Overkirk from 1704 to 1708 and Tilly from 1708.[57]
  11. ^ This was in part possible due to the help from Flemish citizens who were dissatisfied with their new Anglo-Dutch rulers.[75]
  12. ^ Also known as the Mesnager Convention.
  13. ^ Although judged favourably by contemporaries,[118] modern historians still argue about the true effectiveness of the barrier fortresses, since they were conquered by France during the War of the Austrian Succession.[119][120] Advocates instead emphasise that it took 3 years of campaigning for the French to conquer all barrier fortresses and that the purpose of the barrier was to give the Dutch enough time to mobilize and fortify their own borders. According to them, nobody in the Dutch Republic was under the illusion that the barrier would itself stop French armies.[121][122]

References

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  1. ^ Dwyer 2014, p. 14.
  2. ^ Lynn 1994, p. 894.
  3. ^ Vault 2016, pp. 98, 540, 625.
  4. ^ Vault 2016, p. 454.
  5. ^ Wilson 2016, p. 461.
  6. ^ Wilson 2016, p. 460.
  7. ^ Glete 2001, p. 156.
  8. ^ Ostwald 2000, p. 664.
  9. ^ Rasler 1994, p. 129.
  10. ^ Craig 1964, p. 7.
  11. ^ Wijn 1956, p. 509.
  12. ^ a b c d Clodfelter 2008, p. 74.
  13. ^ Urlanis 1971, p. 187.
  14. ^ Levy 2014, p. 90.
  15. ^ Hochedlinger 2003, p. 171.
  16. ^ Storrs 2006, pp. 6–7.
  17. ^ Frey & Frey 1995, pp. 191–192.
  18. ^ Childs 2013, p. 1.
  19. ^ White 2011, pp. 542–543.
  20. ^ de Vries 2009, pp. 151–194.
  21. ^ Meerts 2014, p. 168.
  22. ^ Frey & Frey 1995, p. 389.
  23. ^ McKay & Scott 1983, pp. 54–55.
  24. ^ Ward & Leathes 2010, p. 385.
  25. ^ Ingrao 2010, p. 105.
  26. ^ Kamen 2001, p. 3.
  27. ^ a b Rule 2017, pp. 91–108.
  28. ^ Falkner 2015, pp. 508–510.
  29. ^ Gregg 2001, p. 126.
  30. ^ Somerset 2012, p. 166.
  31. ^ Falkner 2015, p. 96.
  32. ^ Thompson 1973, pp. 158–160.
  33. ^ Israel 1990, pp. 197–199.
  34. ^ Somerset 2012, p. 167.
  35. ^ Somerset 2012, p. 168.
  36. ^ a b Wolf 1974, p. 514.
  37. ^ Nimwegen 2020, p. 261.
  38. ^ Schmidt Voges & Solana Crespo 2017, p. 2.
  39. ^ Rothbard 2010.
  40. ^ Schaeper 1986, p. 1.
  41. ^ a b Nimwegen 1995, p. 9.
  42. ^ Childs 2013, p. 2.
  43. ^ Falkner 2015, p. 37.
  44. ^ a b Kamen 2002, p. 435.
  45. ^ a b Kamen 2002, p. 440.
  46. ^ Cowans 2003, pp. 26–27.
  47. ^ Kamen 2002, pp. 442–444.
  48. ^ Rowlands 2013, p. 24.
  49. ^ Ingrao 1979, p. 220.
  50. ^ Hattendorf 1979, pp. 50–54.
  51. ^ Ingrao 1979, pp. 39–40.
  52. ^ Burke.
  53. ^ Shinsuke 2013, pp. 37–40.
  54. ^ Ostwald 2014, pp. 100–129.
  55. ^ Rowen 1954, p. 3.
  56. ^ a b Lesaffer.
  57. ^ Nimwegen (2020), pp. 184, 262, 306.
  58. ^ Van Alphen et al. 2021, p. 86.
  59. ^ Symcox 1985, pp. 146–147.
  60. ^ Symcox 1985, p. 149.
  61. ^ Dhondt 2015, pp. 16–17.
  62. ^ Lynn 1999, pp. 270–271.
  63. ^ Lynn 1999, pp. 276–277.
  64. ^ Falkner 2015, p. 1302.
  65. ^ Sundstrom 1992, p. 196.
  66. ^ Symcox 1985, p. 155.
  67. ^ Lynn 1999, p. 275.
  68. ^ Lynn 1999, pp. 280–281.
  69. ^ Ingrao 1979, p. 123.
  70. ^ Lynn 1999, pp. 286–294.
  71. ^ a b Lynn 1999, pp. 298–299.
  72. ^ Nimwegen 2020, p. 285.
  73. ^ Holmes 2008, pp. 347–349.
  74. ^ a b Lynn 1999, pp. 320–323.
  75. ^ a b Veenendaal 1950, pp. 34–41.
  76. ^ a b Nimwegen 2020, p. 354.
  77. ^ a b Atkinson 1944, pp. 233–233.
  78. ^ Francis 1965, pp. 71–93.
  79. ^ Lynn 1999, p. 296.
  80. ^ Lynn 1999, p. 302.
  81. ^ Nicholson 1955, pp. 124–125.
  82. ^ Bromley 1979, p. 446.
  83. ^ a b Ward & Leathes 2010, pp. 422–423.
  84. ^ Nimwegen 2020, p. 307.
  85. ^ Nimwegen 2020, pp. 307–308 & 321.
  86. ^ Kamen 2001, pp. 70–72.
  87. ^ Ward & Leathes 2010, p. 424.
  88. ^ Holmes 2008, p. 433.
  89. ^ a b c Gregg 2001, p. 289.
  90. ^ Veendendaal 1970, p. 438–439.
  91. ^ Veendendaal 1970, p. 439.
  92. ^ Kamen 2001, p. 101.
  93. ^ Hattendorf 1978, p. 304.
  94. ^ Onnekink & Bruin 2013, p. 65–66.
  95. ^ Simms 2008, pp. 60–64.
  96. ^ Bromley 1979, pp. 459–460.
  97. ^ Elliott 2014, p. 63.
  98. ^ Somerset 2012, p. 470.
  99. ^ Gregg 2001, p. 354.
  100. ^ Somerset 2012, p. 477.
  101. ^ Holmes 2008, p. 462.
  102. ^ Myers 1917, pp. 799–829.
  103. ^ Nimwegen 2002, p. 29.
  104. ^ Somerset 2012, pp. 494–495.
  105. ^ Frey & Frey 1995, pp. 374–375.
  106. ^ Lesaffer 2014.
  107. ^ Vives 1969, p. 591.
  108. ^ Fernández-Xesta y Vázquez 2012, p. 244.
  109. ^ Colville 1935, p. 149.
  110. ^ a b Lynn 1999, pp. 361–362.
  111. ^ McKay & Scott 1983, pp. 138–140.
  112. ^ Falkner 2015, pp. 4173–4181.
  113. ^ Lindsay 1957, p. 420.
  114. ^ Pincus 2012, pp. 7–8.
  115. ^ Szechi 1994, pp. 93–95.
  116. ^ Carlos, Neal & Wandschneider 2006, p. 2.
  117. ^ Elliott 2014, p. 8.
  118. ^ Nimwegen 2002, pp. 31–35.
  119. ^ Ward & Leathes 2010, p. 57.
  120. ^ Kubben 2011, p. 148.
  121. ^ Wijn 1964, p. 703.
  122. ^ Nimwegen 2002, pp. 31–33.
  123. ^ "Golden Age of Piracy – Post Spanish Succession Period". goldenageofpiracy.org. Retrieved 25 August 2020.

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Further reading

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