Abstractionismus
Abstractionismus est theoria quae dicit mentem nonnullas vel omnes ex eius conceptis abstractione obtinere e conceptis quae iam tenet, vel ex experientia.[1] Notio coloris viridis, exempli gratia, e copia experientiarum quae viridem (aliasque proprietates) implicant extrahi potest. Praeterea, conceptum genericum sicut "holus" e conceptis eius patefactionum iam intellectis (carota, brassica, cepa, et ceterae) extrahatur. Haec autem sententia a Georgio Berkeley[2] et Petro Geach reprehensa est.[1]
Abstractionismus in mathematica[3] et litteris[4] inter varios motus artis abstractae[5] videatur.
Nexus interni
Notae
recensereBibliographia
recensere- Ebert, Philip A., et Marcus Rossberg, eds. 2016. Abstractionism: essays in philosophy of mathematics. Oxoniae et Novi Eboraci: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199645268, ISBN 0199645264.
- Flage, Daniel. 1986. Berkeley on Abstraction. Journal of the History of Philosophy 24(4): 483–501. doi:10.1353/hph.1986.0073.
- Geach, Peter. 1957. Mental Acts: Their Contents and Their Objects. Londinii: Routledge Kegan Paul.
- Gooding, Mel. 2001. Abstract art. Cantabrigiae et Novi Eboraci: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521809282.
- Hoffman, Michael J. 1965. The development of abstractionism in the writings of Gertrude Stein. Philadelphiae: University of Pennsylvania Press.