William J. Hamblin (1954–2019)

"This volume of articles is based on papers presented at the Symposium on Warfare in the Book of Mormon, held 24–25 March 1989 at Brigham Young University..."

By my count, the 22 chapters in this book are written by 15 different authors.

A wide variety of topics related to warfare are covered. Much more than I supposed.

"Mormon begins his commentary in the aforementioned thirteen chapters [of the book of Alma] with a description of Korihor the anti-Christ and an encounter he had with Alma. The text clearly points to six propositions Korihor used in an attempt to dissuade Alma and others from their beliefs. Korihor argued that (1) religious doctrines and prophecies are foolish and unenlightened ancestors create superstitious traditions (see Alma 30:13–14, 28), (2) only evidence that the physical senses can confirm is valid (see Alma 30:15), (3) religious convictions result from a frenzied and deranged mind (see Alma 30:16, 28), (4) God does not intervene in life—we survive only by our own efforts (see Alma 30:17), (5) there is no such thing as a crime (see Alma 30:17–18), and (6) churches are instruments of bondage, slavery, and oppression (see Alma 30:27). These were not new arguments then, nor are they unfamiliar to those who live today. They are fundamental to a popular modern worldview." (Page 236; At the start of chapter 12)

We tend to think that the Book of Mormon has a lot about conflict between Lamanites versus the Nephites. However:
"The armed conflicts Mormon reports can be understood more clearly if this spiritual context is taken into account. This is particularly true when it is remembered that the actual leaders of the conflicts were, in the main, Nephites and dissident Nephites rather than Nephites and Lamanites." (Page 241)

"There are two primary ideological components identified in the book of Alma. First, traditional Nephite political and military policies presupposed the existence of God, personal accountability, and divine intervention. This is in accord with the vertical tradition. Second, a relativistic, agnostic philosophy became dominant among much of the educated intelligentsia, the policy-making portion of Nephite society. This is in accord with the horizontal tradition. Nehor popularized a version of this philosophy and sought to enforce his priestcraft with the sword (see Alma 1:12). Horizontal curricula designed by dissident Nephites were also major influences in the Lamanite educational system (see Mosiah 24:4–7). The burning of believers and their religious texts at Ammonihah may also demonstrate the presence of a horizontal mindset in the Nephite culture (see Alma 14:8). The conflicting assumptions of these two distinct ideological positions often found expression in internal and external armed conflict in the Nephite nation." (Page 242)

Chapter 18 The Bow and Arrow in the Book of Mormon - I found this analysis of various categories of weaponry, and of bow construction quite enlightening.

Table of Contents
Why Study Warfare in the Book of Mormon? By John W. Welch
Why Is So Much of the Book of Mormon Given Over to Military Accounts? By R. Douglas Phillips
Purpose of the War Chapters in the Book of Mormon By Richard Dilworth Rust
An Oath of Allegiance in the Book of Mormon By Terrence L. Szink
Law and War in the Book of Mormon By John W. Welch
"Holy War": The Sacral Ideology of War in the Book of Mormon and in the Ancient Near East - The Basic Pattern By Stephen D. Ricks
The Sons of Mosiah: Emissaries of Peace By John A. Tvedtnes
Warfare and the Book of Mormon By Hugh Nibley
The Gadianton Robbers as Guerrilla Warriors By Daniel C. Peterson
Notes on "Gadianton Masonry" By Daniel C. Peterson
Secret Combinations, Warfare, and Captive Sacrifice in Mesoamerica and the Book of Mormon By Bruce W. Warren
The Impact of Shifting Cultural Assumptions on the Military Policies Directing Armed Conflict Reported in the Book of Alma By Matthew M. F. Hilton, Neil J. Flinders
Nephite Captains and Armies By A. Brent Merrill
Book of Mormon Tribal Affiliation and Military Castes By John A. Tvedtnes
Swords in the Book of Mormon By William J. Hamblin, A. Brent Merrill
Scimitars, Cimeters! We Have Scimitars! Do We Need Another Cimeter? By Paul Y. Hoskisson
Notes on the Cimeter (Scimitar) in the Book of Mormon By William J. Hamblin, A. Brent Merrill
The Bow and Arrow in the Book of Mormon By William J. Hamblin
Armor in the Book of Mormon By William J. Hamblin
Fortifications in the Book of Mormon Account Compared with Mesoamerican Fortifications By John L. Sorenson
Seasonality of Warfare in the Book of Mormon and in Mesoamerica By John L. Sorenson
The Importance of Warfare in Book of Mormon Studies By William J. Hamblin… (more)

The Fatimids - named for their claimed descent from Muhammad's daughter Fatima - were a Shiite dynasty that conquered Egypt in the tenth century, and on the eve of the First Crusade held also Palestine and Lebanon. They accordingly became one of the crusaders' chief opponents.

The Fatimid army has often been described as a rabble whose only military virtue was its vast size. This, argues Hamblin, is a mistake based on taking the exaggerated numbers given for Fatimid forces by Latin chroniclers literally. By consulting the Arab chroniclers and considering the financial limits of the Fatimid caliphate - he essentially divides the tax income by the salary of a soldier to arrive at a maximum affordable army size - one can arrive at more realistic estimates and see that Fatimid armies, while typically larger than crusader ones, did not vastly outnumber them.

He also shows that at least the regular core of the army was well trained and equipped - there is no reason to suppose that they one-for-one were any worse soldiers than their crusader opponents. So why did they nevertheless lose? Hamblin suggests three reasons, one strategic, one organizational, one personal:

The Fatimid field army was based at Cairo, and need about two months to reach the battlefields in southern Palestine, whereas the crusaders based themselves in Palestine itself. Thus, the crusaders had plentiful advance warning of any Fatimid attack, whereas if they themselves attacked a Fatmid outpost, they had two months to try and take it before any serious relief could arrive.

The Fatimid army consisted of number of different groups - the "westerners" (Berbers), the "easterners" (Turks, Armenians, etc) and the Sudanis (Subsaharan blacks), plus irregular auxiliaries such as bedouin. In theory, these different groups balanced each other, allowing the dynasty to maintain control rather than become the virtual prisoners of their army as had happened to other medieval Islamic dynasties. In practice, they were sometimes more interested in fighting one another rather than the enemy, and even at the best of times the army suffered from a lack of cohesion.

Finally, the vizier al-Afdal, who was the de facto ruler of the Fatimid caliphate during the First Crusade and until 1026, simply wasn't a very effective war leader. At the battle of Ascalon in 1099, he let his army be surprised and defeated before it could properly assume battle order. Afterwards he prefered to stay in Cairo - to discourage any coups in his absence - and sending to the front a series of underlings, none of which got the opportunity to serve long enough to become intimately familiar with the theatre.… (more)

If you are curious about any aspect of warfare that falls within the chronological and geographic scope of this book, you will either find what you want to know within its pages or remain forever unsatisfied. Professor Hamblin may have missed one or two facts about warfare in the Fertile Crescent, Egypt and adjoining regions from the Neolithic era through the middle of the Bronze Age, but his assemblage of evidence is comprehensive and his interpretations judicious. It's not his fault that so much remains unknown and probably unknowable about this vast period.

While the subtitle may give the impression that the work's emphasis lies in the fuzzy realm of "war and society", there are plenty of solid data about how armies were raised and organized, where and how they campaigned, and how they fought. The lacunae are, of course, large. From all those millennia, there survives not a single record that allows us to reconstruct a battle. Nor do we know how such weapons as Mesopotamian proto-chariots were deployed or to what extent troops engaged tactically rather than rushing helter-skelter into the fray. On the other hand, quite a bit can be said about military ideology, the recruitment, size and organization of armies, fortifications, siegecraft and armaments. It is also possible to trace the general course, if not the details, of a great many campaigns

The author eschews those speculative comparisons between ancient warriors and contemporary primitives that are popular among his colleagues. There's nary an allusion to skirmishes in Papua New Guinea. Indeed, readers may wish that, like the paradigmatic economist, he had fewer hands on which to weigh alternative theories. Happily, any tedium from the balancing act is staved off by abundant quotations from contemporary sources. It's fascinating to read Hammurabi's dispatches to his commanders or the autobiography of a Nubian mercenary in the service of an Egyptian warlord.

Sadly, the costs of modern book production have deprived this volume of most of the maps and illustrations that it needs. The lack is partly compensated by the author's careful descriptions of key artistic evidence, but those who can will want to have Yigael Yadin's The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands or the like at hand as they read.

Professor Hamblin promises a second volume to carry his study into the Iron Age. I look forward to it already.… (more)