John Mosier

A small but comprehensive biography of Grant and what made him such an effective general. Mosier's most conspicuous achievement is that his narrative foregoes military jargon to present Grant as an ordinary man. This makes 'Grant' a compelling and inspirational read. Mosier's prose is exceptional and simple.

The only downside though, for some readers, might be that Mosier is no Ron Chernow and 'Grant' is not overly detailed like other biographies. But for me, Mosier's greatest achievement is that he retains the man who Grant was and disallows him from becoming lost in historical detail.… (more)

I have given [a:John Mosier|337937|John Mosier|https://s.gr-assets.com/assets/nophoto/user/u_50x66-632230dc9882b4352d753eedf9396530.png]'s The Blitzkrieg Myth four stars as I believe there is a useful role in authors who take a contrarian position, shaking up our thinking. That said, if you have not read other accounts of the campaigns in the Second World War, I suggest that you not start with this book. I also appreciate the arguments made by the reviewers who only gave Mosier two stars - and in particular recommend
Emmanuel Gustin's review.

In his introduction, Mosier names [a:J.F.C. Fuller|225974|J.F.C. Fuller|https://images.gr-assets.com/authors/1339793603p2/225974.jpg] and [a:Giulio Douhet|964282|Giulio Douhet|https://s.gr-assets.com/assets/nophoto/user/u_50x66-632230dc9882b4352d753eedf9396530.png] as the sources of flawed doctrine - and attempts to group their theories together under term he coined as "breakthrough theory". This seemed to be setting up straw men. Fuller's vision of fully mechanised armies never came about. Douhet's strategy of attacking cities to destroy civilian morale did - but it was a desperation tactic, adopted when airpower proved incapable of reaching and destroying militarily significant _targets.

It is unclear exactly how influential these two theorists were. Douhet does not appear to have been studied in the the UK, the only country that attempted to build a strategic bombing force before the war. Fuller was noted for his acerbic criticism of his peers and superiors, and his support for the the British fascists prior to the war made him highly suspect. [a:Heinz Guderian|148433|Heinz Guderian|https://images.gr-assets.com/authors/1239227513p2/148433.jpg] mentioned the influence of "the Englishmen, Fuller, Liddell Hart and Martel" in [b:Panzer Leader|13312947|Panzer Leader|Heinz Guderian|https://s.gr-assets.com/assets/nophoto/book/50x75-a91bf249278a81aabab721ef782c4a74.png|246161], but [a:John Mearsheimer|7456926|John Mearsheimer|https://s.gr-assets.com/assets/nophoto/user/u_50x66-632230dc9882b4352d753eedf9396530.png] points out in [b:Liddell Hart and the Weight of History|7548686|Liddell Hart and the Weight of History|John J. Mearsheimer|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1348514264l/7548686._SY75_.jpg|1130699] that this reference was not in the the German edition of Panzer Leader, but included in the English version at the suggestion of the editor, Liddell Hart. If anything, the the German development of Blitzkrieg seems to be better attributed to Germany's own war experience, including the development of sturmtruppen tactics.

The failure of strategic bombing to break morale has been well documented elsewhere. Mosier adds little that is new.

Mosier gives his opinion freely over land operations. We learn that he likes Montgomery (notwithstanding the Arnhem disaster), thinks Rommel was over rated, and thinks that Eisenhower was wise to to let to pick favourites amongst Montgomery, Bradley or Patton. I put these into the category of opinions that others will want to argue about.

The most challenging point Mosier raises relates to the fall of France. The German drive through the Ardennes in May 1940 all the way to the English Chanel, forcing the evacuation of the British (and other) surrounded forces from Dunkirk is seen as the textbook example of Blitzkrieg. Mosier attributes the German success primarily to a loss of nerve by the French and British high command and politicians. He asserts that the breakthrough could have been countered if the British had only counter-attacked, instead of withdrawing - but a quick look at a map shows that this looks implausible.

Notably, Mosier only comments in passing on the Russian campaign, but this would be important to establishing his case. The German offensives of of 1941 and 1942 were also classic Blitzkrieg, sweeping around pockets of Soviet forces who later became prisoners - and the Soviet counterattacks also followed a similar model, punching through weakened defences in an attempt to surround German forces.

Mosier shows enthusiasm for attacking on a broad front, which must make most of those who have studied strategy worried. This seems to contradict the principle of concentration of force. In practice, what Mosier sees as a broad front is an illusion. The Second World War was ultimately decided by attrition - the Germans lacked the manpower and resources to win, and were gradually worn down, and the land campaigns (particularly in the East) were fundamental to that process. But what looks like a broad front on a large scale map, lacks texture and will have many subordinate (and narrow) offensives when examined at the tactical level. At the tactical level, concentration of force is still needed.… (more)

Some interesting and thought-provoking theses, but there is a pretty high level of snark that runs through the footnotes that's a bit off-putting. Some of the theses (like the failure of strategic bombing or the issues with the Sherman tank, or that the 1940 Norway campaign wasn't a good idea) aren't particularly new, but have been reported extensively, elsewhere. He's also quite pointedly pro-Montgomery, which is rather different from other historians. The most interesting thesis he has is that France collapsed in 1940 because of panic by British and French politicians, which is plausible. Oddly, the book leaves out a discussion of Kasserine Pass, which was a signal failure of US arms during the war. He also, a number of times, refers to "von Paulus," which is a pet peeve of mine. A lot of reviews I've seen say read this, but make sure to read other books (especially the ones Mosier denigrates) for balance, which sounds like a good idea.… (more)